Dear guest, It all started with… dinosaurs. From an early age I was fascinated by those strange creatures that walked the earth millions of years ago. Not surprisingly, as a young boy I wanted to become a paleontologist. This initial plan concerning my future took a slight turn from the moment I met Michaël Ghijs (1933-2008), a Catholic priest and teacher at the high school I was attending. He was also the founding conductor of the boys’ and men’s choir Schola Cantorum Cantate Domino. He enabled his singers, me being one of them, to broaden their horizon on many levels: on the geographical and cultural level by literally travelling the world with us, but also spiritually by living out the message of the Gospel. Inspired by his example and my experiences within his choir, I decided to commit myself to a further exploration of The Christian Story. I hold a master’s degree in Religious Studies at the Catholic University of Leuven (Belgium). It was in Leuven I first encountered the work of René Girard (1923-2015), one of the great intellectuals of our time and immortel of the Académie française. A little book by a great theologian, Knowing Jesus by James Alison, set me on track to discover Girard’s further developed Mimetic Theory. For me, this became an anthropological and interdisciplinary starting point to challenge the richness of the Christian tradition. It affected me in a very profound way, and I’m convinced that the thought provoking power of Mimetic Theory can support our multi-layered human society on the road to ‘post-sacrificial’ peace. Eventually, I published several books and articles on René Girard, Mimetic Theory, culture and religion. I also became a member of the Dutch Girard Society and of COV&R (the Colloquium on Violence & Religion). In 2019, I became an elected member of the board of COV&R for several years. In 2011, I started Mimetic Margins, a blog to explore the work of René Girard (and many others) further. Scapegoat Shadows, this website, is a reboot of my first online activity in that regard. It contains the Mimetic Margins Archives (with lots of instructive debates under certain posts), as well as new material. I’m currently teaching at a Jesuit High School, Sint-Jozefscollege, in Aalst (Belgium). I am also a journalist and editor-at-large for Tertio, a weekly magazine. In my spare time I keep on singing, as an alto or countertenor, trained at Schola Cantorum Cantate Domino as I mentioned (I was a member from 1991-2010). I took part in several recordings, both as a choir member and as a soloist.

Saved from the Denial of Death?

by ERIK BUYS on May 26, 2016May 26, 2016

In 1973, cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker (1924-1974) published his seminal book The Denial of Death. Because of this publication, a year later and two months after his death, Becker was granted the Pulitzer Prize for general non-fiction.

The Denial of Death elaborates the following thesis:

The basic motivation for human behavior is our biological need to control our basic anxiety, to deny the terror of death.

One of the most important functions of culture therefore is to provide symbolic defense mechanisms against the knowledge of mortality. Culture, and religion in particular, can be understood as an attempt to deny death. In this context Becker writes about immortality projects. These projects allow us to create a symbolic, so-called meaningful and heroic self-concept that we feel outlasts our physical self and time on earth.

Combined with the insights of yet another “out of the box” thinking literary critic and anthropologist, René Girard (1923-2015), we might conclude that the creation of our heroic self-concepts is possible because of our mimetic (i.e. imitative) nature.

The way we think about ourselves and the way we develop a sense of identity is always mediated by our social environment. And that which makes something like a social environment possible precisely is our – indeed mimetic – ability to put ourselves in each other’s shoes. Neuroscientists have discovered that so-called mirror neurons in our brains play a very important role in this regard. These brain cells allow us to imitate others. They allow us to pretend that we’re someone else and to take another person’s point of view. And this allows us to imagine what others are experiencing, thinking, expecting or even desiring. In short, our mimetic ability is the conditio sine qua non to empathize and bond with others, and to develop a sense of self.

Of course our imaginative projections about others can be wrong. That’s why we, rather unwittingly, constantly look for the confirmation of mutually established social expectations. The question “Am I doing this right?” seems to be the ever present subtext to our behavior. It really structures the interaction between ourselves and others. To quote sociologist Niklas Luhmann (1927-1998), we expect that others have certain expectations and act accordingly. That’s how a social order is established in a particular culture.

Each (sub-)cultural environment establishes its own identity concepts, based on particular mimetic interactions. Those identity concepts are models that we use to create a meaningful image for ourselves. As stated earlier, according to Becker, a meaningful culturally defined self-image can be understood as an attempt to escape the realization that we are mortal beings. In other words,

our attempt to create an image that is loved by others whose respect we (mimetically) learned to desire = an attempt to deny death.

Although they might provide us with a good and secure feeling, there’s a downside to our immortality projects. We might become so obsessed with our symbolic, so-called meaningful self-image that we might be prepared to literally sacrifice ourselves to it. As anxious persons, we show the tendency to act according to the supposed expectations of “meaningful” others in order to gain their approval. As we become more obsessed with our social status, we might accomplish exactly what we were trying to move away from, death! Think of workaholics who destroy their own health, or think of ISIL suicide bombers, who sacrifice themselves in order to gain a supposedly “sacred” identity. Jesus of Nazareth formulates this tragic, failed and paradoxical attempt at “the denial of death” in our cultural and/or religious projects very succinctly in the Gospels (Matthew 16:25a-26a):

For whoever would save his life will lose it. For what will it profit a man if he gains the whole world and forfeits his soul?

And not only that, we might also be prepared to sacrifice those others we deem a threat to our self-image. Jesus himself becomes a victim of people (among them are his own disciples!) who try to protect their “socially acceptable” self-image.

In short, if we make it our goal “to be loved” by so-called meaningful others, we tend to become auto- and hetero-aggressive.

ernest-becker-quote-the-idea-of-death The question is whether we can be saved from our sacrificial tendencies. Since we are relational beings [or since our being is essentially relational], we can only be saved from these tendencies if we receive an identity from a being that is not at all interested in “being loved” (a being that comes from outside the human game of mutually established social expectations). This can only be a being that is not mortal, since it is mortality that leads human beings to the desire “to be loved”. If we experience the love of such a being, we can distance ourselves more and more from the desire to adjust ourselves to a self-image that seeks the approval of others. Moreover, since we diminish our auto-aggressive tendencies we will also diminish our hetero-aggressive tendencies. We will no longer defend a so-called socially acceptable self-image at the expense of others. Paradoxically, the acknowledgment of ourselves and our mortality might allow us to surrender to that Love that is “not defined by death”. Our newly found ability “to love” will enable others to love themselves as well, and save them as well from their auto-aggressive tendencies, thus enabling them to love others, etcetera. Until the whole world is “saved” by this Love.

Christians are convinced that the “Spirit of Love” springs from the relationship between Jesus of Nazareth and his so-called “Father”. They believe that God can be experienced as a Love – at least at the human level – that is not defined by death. One of the images they use to speak of this Love indeed is the image of the Trinity (love means “relation”, thus the image of a relation between a Father and a Son, and the Spirit that springs from that relation, is appropriate). To be loved by Jesus of Nazareth thus means to be loved by a being that allows us to more fully accept ourselves and others.

In other words,

the Love incarnated by Jesus potentially saves us from our cultural (be it secular or religious) illusional immortality projects.

Denkgelacherig atheïstisch narcisme / Atheist Narcissism

by ERIK BUYS on April 29, 2016April 29, 2016

DENKGELACHERIG ATHEÏSTISCH NARCISME

[SEE BELOW FOR ENGLISH TRANSLATION]

De volgehouden logica in de evangeliën en de verder ontwikkelde christelijke traditie, wijst in de richting van “Jezus als ultieme, soms pijnlijk consequente realist in een wereld van narcisten”. [Voor meer hierover: klik hier]. Dat bepaalde mensen, ondanks alle rationele argumenten, blind blijven voor die logica, heeft niet te maken met een veronderstelde “vaagheid” van de christelijke bronnen, maar met een koppig narcisme.

Fundamentalistische christenen, bijvoorbeeld, hangen nogal eens vast aan het geloof in een almachtige God in een eigenlijk niet-christelijke zin [Voor meer hierover: klik hier]. De ervaring leert dat zij moeilijk afstappen van een godsbeeld dat incompatibel is met het godsbeeld dat kan afgeleid worden uit de Christusfiguur van de evangeliën. Als ultieme verdediging van kromme redeneringen trekken zij vaak de kaart van het adagium “Gods wegen zijn ondoorgrondelijk”. Daarmee beëindigen ze iedere vorm van dialoog, discussie en kritische (zelf)reflectie. Maar ook sommige atheïsten houden liever vast aan hun ideeën over het christelijke verhaal (en theologie of zelfs godsdienst in het algemeen) dan dat ze die in vraag zouden stellen. Narcistische, intellectuele zelfgenoegzaamheid is niemand vreemd. Vooral niet als een eerder vijandige opvatting tegenover het christelijke verhaal identiteitsbepalend is. De commentaar van sommige atheïsten, wier blik veelal door negatieve emoties wordt bepaald, op het betoog uit een vorige post [Voor meer hierover: klik hier] is dan ook voorspelbaar: “Dit is een particuliere, misschien zelfs hoogst individuele interpretatie, en uiteindelijk is het allemaal relatief. Wat kunnen we uiteindelijk weten? Met ‘theologie’ kun je alle kanten op!” Alweer duikt het gemakzuchtige en laffe “argument” van “ondoorgrondelijke wegen” op. Tja, voor wie gelooft in rationele argumenten, ondersteund door wetenschappelijke inzichten (van literatuurwetenschap en geschiedenis tot antropologie) zal de ene interpretatie beter en plausibeler zijn dan de andere. Het is allemaal niet zo “ondoorgrondelijk” of “vaag” of “incoherent”.

Op de vragen “Welke beweringen doet het christelijke verhaal en wat is de essentie van het christelijke geloof?” bestaan wel degelijk antwoorden die, vanuit rationeel en wetenschappelijk verantwoord onderzoek, plausibeler zijn dan andere. Wat narcisten ook mogen beweren. Zowel gelovigen als ongelovigen kunnen een onderzoek instellen naar het antwoord op die vragen.

Wat het intellectuele narcisme van sommige atheïsten betreft, is een “debat” dat georganiseerd werd door Het Denkgelag een mooi voorbeeld. Op 17 oktober 2013 hielden Daniel Dennett, Lawrence Krauss en Massimo Pigliucci onder de modererende leiding van filosoof Maarten Boudry een panelgesprek over “de grenzen van de wetenschap”.

Dit theekransje van atheïsten oversteeg zelden het niveau van filosofische cafépraat, maar misschien was dat wel de bedoeling – om de drempel laag te houden. Gelukkig zat Massimo Piglicucci in het panel. In ieder geval, je zou denken dat het “om te lachen” was als ze zichzelf niet zo ernstig namen. Genant was onder andere hoe bioloog en filosoof Massimo Pigliucci en filosoof Daniel Dennett aan fysicus Lawrence Krauss moesten uitleggen dat de criteria om te oordelen over het morele of immorele karakter van menselijke daden niet door de wetenschap kunnen bepaald worden. Eens die criteria bepaald zijn – eventueel door langdurig na te denken, dus door “rationaliteit” -, kan wetenschap natuurlijk informatie opleveren aangaande de vraag hoe die morele opvattingen het best in de praktijk worden omgezet. Als je bijvoorbeeld gelooft dat het morele gehalte van een daad bepaald wordt door het geluksniveau dat het oplevert, kun je wetenschappelijk kennis vergaren over de mate waarin een daad in “geluk” resulteert. Op voorwaarde natuurlijk dat je eerst gedefinieerd hebt wat “geluk” dan inhoudt. Wat alweer impliceert dat een filosofische, rationele discussie over “geluk” voorafgaat aan ieder mogelijk wetenschappelijk onderzoek. Het is bijzonder eigenaardig dat dergelijke basisinzichten in het lang en het breed (expliciet een twintigtal minuten) moeten uitgesmeerd worden op een avond die pretendeert een hoogmis voor de rationaliteit te zijn. De aanvankelijke “onenigheid” tussen Pigliucci en Krauss had dan ook geen enkele intellectuele spankracht. Ze was gewoon te wijten aan een gebrekkig inzicht bij Krauss. Pigliucci vat de les wijsbegeerte voor eerstejaarsstudenten uiteindelijk samen (tussen minuut 42:40 en 44:00 van het gesprek):

“Nobody in his right mind, no philosopher in his right mind, I think, is saying that empirical facts, or even some scientific facts – as should be clear by now, I take a more restrictive definition of science or concept of science than Lawrence does – but even if we want to talk about empirical facts, broadly speaking, nobody is denying […] that empirical facts are relevant to ethical decisions. That’s not the question. The question is […] that the empirical facts, most of the times, if not all the times, in ethical decision making, are going to underdetermine those decisions, those value judgements that we make. So the way I think of ethics is of essentially ‘applied rationality’. You start with certain general ideas. Are you adopting a utilitarian framework? Are you adopting a deontological framework, a virtue ethics framework or whatever it is? And then that essentially plays the equivalent role of, sort of, general axioms, if you will, in mathematics or general assumptions in logic. And from there you incorporate knowledge, empirical knowledge, about, among other things, what kind of beings humans are. Ethics, let’s not forget, is about human beings.”

Terecht wees Pigliucci er trouwens op dat Sam Harris in zijn boek The Moral Landscape eigenlijk een gelijkaardige denkfout maakt als Krauss. Harris zal wel veel verdiend hebben aan de verkoop van zijn boek, maar bij nader inzien is het intellectuele volksverlakkerij die weinig om het lijf heeft. Niet verwonderlijk dat Pigliucci er het volgende over zegt (48:22 – 48:44):

“Sam Harris, who you [Maarten Boudry] introduced as a philosopher, I would characterize mostly as a neuroscience based person. I think he would do it that way. When I read his book, ‘The Moral Landscape’ which promised a scientific way of handling ethical questions. I got through the entire book and I didn’t learn anything at all, zero, new about ethics, right?”

Daarnaast ergert Pigliucci zich, opnieuw reagerend op een aantal beweringen van Krauss, aan wetenschappers die generaliserende uitspraken doen over filosofie zonder eigenlijk enig idee te hebben waarover ze spreken (1:12:57 – 1:13:28):

“First of all, most philosophy of science is not at all about helping scientists answer questions. So it is no surprise that it doesn’t. So when people like your colleague Stephen Hawking – to name names – starts out a book and says that philosophy is dead because it hasn’t contributed anything to science, he literally does not know what he is talking about. That is not the point of philosophy of science, most of the time.”

Kortom, de onenigheid die soms dreigde te ontstaan tussen Pigliucci en Dennett aan de ene kant en Krauss aan de andere werd telkens opgelost door Krauss een aantal “bijlessen” te geven. Pigliucci was dan nog zo vriendelijk om dat vaak ietwat onrechtstreeks te doen, maar het is duidelijk dat zijn zojuist vermelde commentaar op Stephen Hawking een manier was om Krauss terecht te wijzen over zijn “red herring” (de herhaalde opmerking van Krauss dat (wetenschaps)filosofie vandaag geen bijdragen levert aan wetenschap is irrelevant omdat ze dat ook niet beoogt). Pigliucci besloot deze discussie met een analogie (1:13:59 – 1:14:12):

“So, yes, philosophy of science doesn’t contribute to science, just like science does not contribute to, you know, English literature. Or literary criticism, whatever you want to put it. But so what, no one is blaming the physicists for not coming up with something new about Jane Austen.”

Je zou verwachten dat Pigliucci dergelijke analogie consequent toepast als het gaat om de afbakening van verschillende onderzoeksvelden, maar toen het over theologie ging nam hij plotseling ook de weinig doordachte houding van Krauss aan. Boudry en Dennett sloten zich trouwens eensgezind bij hun gesprekspartners aan. Blijkbaar hadden deze atheïsten een doodverklaarde “vijand” gevonden – de theologie – die hen verenigde (1:13:46 – 1:13:48):

Lawrence Krauss: “Well, theology, you could say is a dead field…”
Massimo Pigliucci: “Yes, you can say that. Right!”

Aan het begin van de avond bleek al dat de heren op dit vlak zeker van hun stuk waren:

20:11 – 20:21
Maarten Boudry: “Do you think that science, no matter how you define it, or maybe it depends, has disproven or refuted god’s existence?”

21:10 – 21:30
Lawrence Krauss: “What we can say, and what I think is really important, is that science is inconsistent with every religion in the world. That every organized religion based on scripture and doctrine is inconsistent with science. So they’re all garbage and nonsense. That you can say with definitive authority.”

21:50 – 22:42
Massimo Pigliucci: “I get nervous whenever I hear people talking about ‘the god hypothesis’. Because I think that’s conceding too much. Well, it seems to me, in order to talk about a hypothesis, you really have to have something fairly well articulated, coherent, that makes predictions that are actually falsifiable. All that sort of stuff. […] All these [god-] concepts are incoherent, badly put together, if put together at all. […] There is nothing to defeat there. It’s an incoherent, badly articulated concept.”

De eerder uitgewerkte post over de al dan niet narcistische Jezusfiguur van het Nieuwe Testament is een eerste falsificatie van de beweringen van Krauss en Pigliucci. Georganiseerde religie, gebaseerd op zogenoemde openbaringsgeschriften en dogma’s, is niet per definitie inconsistent met wetenschap. Het nieuwtestamentishe godsbeeld is bovendien allesbehalve incoherent. Een korte samenvatting van de desbetreffende vorige post mag dit verduidelijken [Voor meer hierover: klik hier].

De vertegenwoordigers van de tradities die uiteindelijk resulteren in de geschriften van het Nieuwe Testament geloven dat God zich op het niveau van de mensheid openbaart als een liefde die mensen in staat stelt om op een waarachtige wijze zichzelf en anderen te aanvaarden. Zulke, niet direct zichtbare liefde bevat het potentieel om mensen te bevrijden van een leven in functie van het verlangen naar erkenning of, anders gezegd, van een leven uit liefde voor een onwaarachtig imago dat waardering moet opleveren. De auteurs van het Nieuwe Testament definiëren op die manier wat “redding” (Engels: “salvation”) is: wie zich bemind weet, wordt meer en meer bevrijd van de neiging om zichzelf en anderen op te offeren aan “de afgodendienst van het sociale prestige”. Tegelijk geloven de nieuwtestamentische schrijvers dat de liefde die dergelijke offers weigert op een uitzonderlijke wijze belichaamd wordt in Jezus van Nazaret, die precies hierom “Christus” wordt genoemd en als dusdanig wordt geportretteerd ter navolging.

Via onder andere literatuurwetenschappelijk onderzoek kunnen deze heren atheïsten voor zichzelf nagaan in welke mate deze karakterisering van de nieuwtestamentische beweringen de kern van het christelijke geloof bevat. Misschien moeten ze dat eens doen vooraleer ze zich overgeven aan de narcistische pretentie om gezaghebbende uitspraken te doen over “alle theologie”. Het blijft vreemd dat Pigliucci zich ergert aan een fout die sommige natuurwetenschappers wel eens maken met betrekking tot “filosofie”, terwijl hij zelf die fout maakt met betrekking tot “theologie”. Vandaag houdt theologie zich bezig met het interdisciplinair wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar het godsbeeld van een bepaalde religieuze traditie, en met de eventuele implicaties daarvan. Dit heeft overigens niets te maken met geloven of niet geloven in God. Om een analogie te gebruiken: je moet het uiteindelijk niet eens zijn met het mensbeeld van Shakespeare om een onderzoek in te stellen naar de mensvisie die in zijn werken tot uiting komt. Kortom, de vragen waarmee theologen zich bezighouden zijn van een fundamenteel andere aard dan de vragen waarmee natuurwetenschappers zich bezighouden, en er moeten op een fundamenteel niveau dus ook geen conflicten verwacht worden tussen beide onderzoeksvelden. In de woorden van Pigliucci’s eerder geciteerde analogie om het onderscheid tussen natuurwetenschap en filosofie in de verf te zetten: “No one is blaming the physicists for not coming up with something new about Jane Austen.”

Misschien moeten Pigliucci en co maar een voorbeeld nemen aan Georges Lemaître, Belgisch katholiek priester en vermaard fysicus (onder andere grondlegger van de “Big Bang” hypothese). Lemaître maakt een duidelijk onderscheid tussen de vragen waarmee moderne natuurwetenschappers zich bezighouden en de vragen waarmee de auteurs van het Nieuwe Testament bezig zijn. Sterker nog, volgens Lemaître hebben natuurwetenschappelijke vraagstukken niets met theologie te maken, en vice versa. De gelovige natuurwetenschapper kan zijn geloof dan ook geen enkele rol laten spelen in het strikt natuurwetenschappelijke onderzoek. Enkele citaten van Lemaître uit een artikel (klik hier om het te lezen) van Joseph R. Laracy verduidelijken zijn positie aangaande de verhouding tussen de theologie en de moderne natuurwetenschap:

“Should a priest reject relativity because it contains no authoritative exposition on the doctrine of the Trinity? Once you realize that the Bible does not purport to be a textbook of science, the old controversy between religion and science vanishes . . . The doctrine of the Trinity is much more abstruse than anything in relativity or quantum mechanics; but, being necessary for salvation, the doctrine is stated in the Bible. If the theory of relativity had also been necessary for salvation, it would have been revealed to Saint Paul or to Moses . . . As a matter of fact neither Saint Paul nor Moses had the slightest idea of relativity.”

“The Christian researcher has to master and apply with sagacity the technique appropriate to his problem. His investigative means are the same as those of his non-believer colleague . . . In a sense, the researcher makes an abstraction of his faith in his researches. He does this not because his faith could involve him in difficulties, but because it has directly nothing in common with his scientific activity. After all, a Christian does not act differently from any non-believer as far as walking, or running, or swimming is concerned.”

“The writers of the Bible were illuminated more or less — some more than others — on the question of salvation. On other questions they were as wise or ignorant as their generation. Hence it is utterly unimportant that errors in historic and scientific fact should be found in the Bible, especially if the errors related to events that were not directly observed by those who wrote about them . . . The idea that because they were right in their doctrine of immortality and salvation they must also be right on all other subjects, is simply the fallacy of people who have an incomplete understanding of why the Bible was given to us at all.”

De vraag naar wat “redding” of “heil” betekent in nieuwtestamentische zin is inderdaad anders dan bijvoorbeeld de vraag waarom en hoe objecten vallen. Zo eenvoudig kan een inzicht zijn om niet langer als een heroïsche maar narcistische Don Quichot “windmolens” te moeten bevechten. Maar een mens moet zich natuurlijk geen illusies maken: de Maarten Boudry’s van deze wereld gaan zelden of nooit de uitdaging aan om hun geloof aangaande de aard van theologie en religie op een wetenschappelijk verantwoorde manier in vraag te stellen. Maar misschien spreekt nu het narcisme van een theoloog 🙂 ?

Nochtans draagt Boudry wetenschap hoog in het vaandel. Zijn vraag aan het publiek aan het begin van de avond luidde dan ook (16:58 – 17:30): “Do you think that science is the sole source of knowing?” Er waren veel mensen die bevestigend antwoordden op deze vraag. Dit impliceert dan dat je een persoon die je nog nooit ontmoet hebt beter kent dan een persoon die je iedere dag ziet als je maar accurate en gedetailleerde wetenschappelijke beschrijvingen hebt van de persoon die je nooit bent tegengekomen (en geen wetenschappelijke beschrijvingen van de persoon die je iedere dag ziet). Een beetje een vreemde vaststelling. Ergens zou je toch geneigd zijn om te denken dat je een persoon die zich iedere dag, oprecht en in vertrouwen, aan jou openbaart beter kent dan de wetenschappelijk beschreven persoon die je nooit hebt ontmoet… Of zou de “echte” en “volledige” identiteit van een persoon (zijn “ziel”, om met een oud woord te spreken) te herleiden zijn tot wat er wetenschappelijk kan over gezegd worden? Opnieuw een beetje vreemd dat je de persoonlijkheid van iemand zou “opsluiten” in wetenschappelijke analyses…

Wat er ook van zij, natuurlijk zijn Maarten Boudry, Massimo Pigliucci, Lawrence Krauss en Daniel Dennett niet louter narcisten. Het is niet omdat ze aangaande theologie weinig zelfkritische ideeën etaleren dat ze op hun eigen onderzoeksdomeinen geen uitstekend werk verrichten. Maar niets menselijks is de mens vreemd. Iedereen is bij tijd en wijle wel eens een narcist. Scholen kunnen een bijdrage leveren om mensen vrijer te maken van hun eigen narcistische impulsen door hen te oefenen in het onderscheiden van hun eigen motivaties: handelen mensen vanuit een narcistisch verlangen naar erkenning, of is de eventuele erkenning die mensen verwerven een gevolg van een liefde die ze ontwikkeld hebben voor mens, natuur en samenleving?

[English translation:]

NARCISSISTIC ATHEISM

The sustained logic in the Gospels and the further developed Christian tradition points in the direction of “Jesus as ultimate, sometimes painfully consistent realist in a world of narcissists”. Certain people, despite all rational arguments, remain blind to this logic. However, this has nothing to do with a supposed “vagueness” of the Christian resources, but once again with a stubborn narcissism.

Fundamentalist Christians, for instance, quite often believe in a God almighty in an actually non-Christian sense (see higher). They have difficulty abandoning a view of God that is not compatible with the understanding of God that can be derived from the Christ figure in the Gospels. Their ultimate defense of unsustainable reasoning often sounds like, “God works in mysterious ways”. That’s their way of ending any type of dialogue, discussion or self-criticism. But some atheists as well rather stick to their ideas of the Christian story (and theology or even religion in general) than question them. Narcissistic, intellectual complacency can be found in every corner. Especially when a rather hostile opinion about the Christian story is identity enhancing. Comments by some atheists, whose perception is often guided by negative emotions, on this post are thus predictable: “This is a particular type of interpretation, and it is all relative eventually. What is there to know? Theology allows everything!” Once again the lazy and cowardly “argument” of “mysterious ways” comes to the fore. Well, if you believe in rational arguments, sustained by scientific research (from literary criticism to history and anthropology), you will find that one interpretation is better and more plausible than the other. Everything is not that “mysterious” or “vague” or “incoherent” as it seems.

The questions “What claims does the Christian story make and what is the essence of the Christian faith?” do have answers which are, from a rational and scientific point of view, more plausible than others. Whatever narcissists may claim. Theists as well as atheists may set up an inquiry to settle those matters.

A debate (on October 17, 2013), organized by Het Denkgelag about “The Limits of Science” – a conversation between Daniel Dennett, Lawrence Krauss, Massimo Pigliucci, and Maarten Boudry (moderator) – illustrated quite comically some of the unquestioned narcissistic prejudices guiding the discussion on religion in so-called “new atheist” quarters.

This tea party of atheists only sporadically rose above the level of musings from a bar, but maybe this was done deliberately to reach a big audience. Anyway, you would think this conversation was “for laughs” if they wouldn’t take themselves so seriously. For instance, it was quite embarrassing how biologist and philosopher Massimo Pigliucci and philosopher Daniel Dennett had to explain to physicist Lawrence Krauss that the criteria to judge whether or not a human action is moral cannot be defined by science. Once the criteria are established – perhaps after long rational considerations – science might help, of course, to produce information concerning the question how to realize a certain type of morality. If you believe, for instance, that the moral character of a deed is determined by the level of happiness it produces, you may scientifically gather knowledge concerning the degree to which a certain deed results in happiness. After you’ve defined what “happiness” actually entails, that is. Which once again implies that a philosophical, rational discussion on the nature of happiness proceeds every possible scientific research. It is very unusual that these basic insights have to be dealt with in such a lengthy fashion (almost twenty minutes explicitly) on an evening that pretends to be a high mass of rationality. The initial “discord” between Pigliucci and Krauss thus had no intellectual power whatsoever. It was due to ignorance from the part of Krauss. Pigliucci eventually summarizes the course of philosophy for freshmen (between minutes 42:40 and 44:00 of the conversation):

Moreover, Pigliucci was right to point out that Sam Harris makes a similar mistake as Krauss in his book The Moral Landscape. Of course Harris made a lot of money from the sales of his book, but looked at more closely it is an intellectual misleading of the people that is low on substance. No wonder Pigliucci has to say the following on Harris’ book (48:22-48:44):

Apart from that, Pigliucci is irritated by a number of claims done by some scientists, who speak of philosophy (of science) without having a clue what they are talking about. He once again reacts against certain statements by Krauss (1:12:57-1:13:28):

In short, the discord that threatened to arise between Pigliucci and Dennett on the one hand, and Krauss on the other, was resolved time and again by giving Krauss some “extra classes”. Pigliucci had the courtesy to do this somewhat indirectly, but it is clear that his comments on Stephen Hawking were a way of reproaching Krauss for his “red herring” (the repeated remark of Krauss that philosophy (of science) does not contribute anything directly to science is irrelevant because it is not the aim of philosophy). Pigliucci ended this discussion with an analogy (1:13:59 – 1:14:12):

You would expect that Pigliucci is consistent about this analogy when he tries to define different areas of research, but when it came down to theology he too took on the unreflective attitude of Krauss. Boudry and Dennett harmoniously joined their two friends. Apparently the atheists had found a “dead” common enemy, theology, that united them (1:13:46 – 1:13:48):

Lawrence Krauss: “Well, theology, you could say is a dead field…”
Massimo Pigliucci: “Yes, you can say that. Right!”

Already at the beginning of the evening the gentlemen were sure about this issue:

20:11 – 20:21 Maarten Boudry: “Do you think that science, no matter how you define it, or maybe it depends, has disproven or refuted god’s existence?”

A previous post, about the question whether or not the Jesus character of the New Testament is a narcissist, is a first falsification of the claims made by Krauss and Pigliucci. Organized religion, based on so-called revelation, scripture and dogma, is not by definition inconsistent with science. Moreover, the New Testament view of God is not at all incoherent. A short summary of the previous post (Jesus Christ, Narcissist?) may clarify this.

The people who are behind the traditions which eventually produce the New Testament writings believe that God is revealed – at least at a human level – in a love that enables human beings to accept themselves and others in an authentic way. This not directly visible love has the potential to emancipate people from a life lived for the sake of (social) recognition or, in other words, from a life lived for the sake of an untruthful image that should produce some sort of appreciation by others. The New Testament authors thus define “salvation” as follows: people who realize that they are loved for who they are (with their flaws and limitations) are saved, more and more, from the tendency to sacrifice themselves and others to “the idolatry of social prestige”. At the same time the New Testament authors are convinced that this love, that refuses those sacrifices, is exceptionally (though not exclusively) embodied in Jesus of Nazareth, who is therefore called “the Christ” and is depicted as the example par excellence that demands imitation.

By applying literary criticism, among other things, the atheist gentlemen may discover whether or not this characterization of the New Testament claims contains the essence of the Christian faith. Maybe they should do that before they surrender themselves to the narcissistic arrogance of being able to judge “all theology”. It is strange that Pigliucci is irritated by the mistakes some scientists make concerning “philosophy” while he makes a similar mistake concerning “theology”. Theology today has to do with interdisciplinary scientific research into the concept of God held by certain religious traditions, and its possible implications. This has nothing to do with the question whether or not someone believes in God. To use an analogy: eventually you don’t have to agree with Shakespeare’s view of human nature in order to pursue an investigation into the anthropology that can be derived from his plays. In short, the questions theologians concern themselves with are from a fundamentally different nature than the questions scientists concern themselves with, so there shouldn’t be any fundamental conflicts between these two areas of research. In the aforementioned analogy of Pigliucci: “No one is blaming the physicists for not coming up with something new about Jane Austen.”

Maybe Pigliucci and co. should take Georges Lemaître as an example. This Belgian Catholic priest and famous physicist (founder of the “Big Bang” hypothesis among others) clearly distinguishes the questions of modern science from the questions the New Testament authors deal with. In fact, according to Lemaître, questions of modern science have nothing to do with theology, and vice versa. The Christian scientist thus cannot let his faith be of any importance for his scientific work. Some quotes from Lemaître, taken from an article by Joseph R. Laracy (click to read) clarify his position regarding the relationship between theology and modern science:

The question about the meaning of “salvation” in the light of the New Testament indeed is different from, for instance, the question how and why objects fall down. That’s how plain and simple an insight can be in order to stop battling windmills like some heroic but mad and narcissistic Don Quixote. But anyway, a man shouldn’t foster any illusions: Maarten Boudry, Lawrence Krauss and other similar atheists rarely, if ever, rise to the challenge to question their belief regarding the nature of theology in a scientific way. But maybe this is just the narcissism of a theologian speaking now ?

Nonetheless, Boudry claims that he holds science in high regard. His question for the audience at the beginning of the evening already suggests this (16:58-17:30): “Do you think that science is the sole source of knowing?” A lot of people answered affirmatively. But what does that mean when you meet another person? Does that mean that you don’t ever know that person when you have not analyzed and described him or her scientifically? And, on the other hand: does that mean that you can know a person merely by detailed scientific descriptions, without ever meeting him or her? A bit odd, to say the least. Somehow you would expect that you know the person who reveals himself to you, every day, honestly and faithfully, better than the person you know from scientific descriptions but have never met. Or would it be true that the “real” and “complete” identity of a person (his “soul”, to use an age old word) can be reduced to what science may say about him? Again, a bit odd to “lock up” someone’s personality in scientific descriptions…

Anyway, of course Maarten Boudry, Massimo Pigliucci, Lawrence Krauss and Daniel Dennett are more than just intellectual narcissists. It just so happens that they don’t really show any sign of self-criticism regarding theology. And that’s a pity, really, because scientifically enhanced theological research (based on the historical-critical method) could prevent some of the excesses of fundamentalism. Sure, Boudry et al. are delivering the goods in their own fields of research. However, nothing human is alien to humans… Every once in a while, everyone is a narcissist, no? There might be one exception, though…

Prince (1958-2016)

by ERIK BUYS on April 21, 2016April 21, 2016

On Thursday, April 21, 2016 legendary pop artist Prince was found dead in his studio.

Love him or hate him, without a doubt he was a true musical genius who inspired and will inspire countless musicians, artists, performers and fans. His was a genuine celebration of Life.

Sometimes it snows in April…

A tribute:

Via Crucis (Wim Delvoye & David Bowie)

by ERIK BUYS on March 14, 2016March 14, 2016

Wim Delvoye made an intriguing Via Crucis, using X-ray images of rats to depict the different Stations of the Cross. I used it together with the song Lazarus by the late David Bowie to make a meditation. Apart from some scenes of the graphic novel Maus by Art Spiegelman, other images included are:

Ash Jesus (Zhang Huan, 2011)
Still Life or Pieta (Sam Jinks, 2007)
Black Christ (Vanessa Beecroft, 2006)
Tote Blauracke – Dead Bluebird (Albrecht Dürer, 1512)

Click to watch:

The Porn Star & Ignatius

by ERIK BUYS on February 17, 2016February 17, 2016

What makes a saint a saint?

Christian spirituality, and the Catholic spirituality in particular, very much focuses on the power of examples.

As modern psychology shows, humans get access to their particular cultural environments through mimetic processes (i.e. processes of imitation). Perhaps the importance of imitation as the heart of the human (psycho)social identity formation becomes paradoxically visible with the observation of children who lack the example of other human beings while growing up. Feral children often imitate animals instead, with all due consequences.

It is no coincidence that an authentic spirituality, in line with what makes humans “human”, is based on the question “Who am I?” understood as “Whom should I follow / imitate?” Indeed, we receive our identity from others who either free us to ourselves or enslave us to an alienating social status we learn to uphold. We never build our identity “from scratch”. We are relational beings, our being is essentially relational, and all kinds of relationships are prior to our sense of self or “I”.

The great spiritual figures and mystics of the Christian traditions have always believed that we come to ourselves by imitating Christ (see De Imitatione Christi by Thomas à Kempis – 1380-1471). This does not mean literally imitating some kind of idol (that is a perversion of spirituality) but imitating the life and love present in the figure of Christ. So what this actually means is: stepping into the realm of a love that allows us to be honest about and true to ourselves so that we become capable of lovingly accepting others as well.

Thus saints in the Catholic tradition are not saints because they are unrealistic examples of so-called ideal, perfect people. That would make them idols, crushing all too pious minds under guilt, shame and resentment. On the contrary, saints are saints because they found the audacity to be “painfully honest” about themselves and no longer hid their imperfections, flaws and “sins” from themselves and others.

“Hello, I’m Ignatius, alcoholic”

Saints are people who follow the advice of Jesus in the Gospel of John (8:32), “Know the truth and the truth will set you free…” Free to love. An alcoholic, for instance, who enters the loving realm of an AA meeting and is finally enabled to admit to himself that he is an alcoholic, indeed enters the first step on a journey that will enable him to find himself again. This in turn will enable him to approach others from what he has to give rather than approach others from his particular “needs”.

The conversion experience of Saint Ignatius Loyola (click for more) can be understood in these terms. He converted to “God”, which was a conversion to “himself” at the same time. This does not mean that Ignatius became “God”, but that he found the realm of a love that allowed him to accept himself. Ignatius turned away from the prideful social status he wanted to uphold. The love for a chivalric image and his romantic dreams had prevented him, like some mad “Don Quixote”, from loving others, whom he merely used as “means” to confirm his self-image (either as “enemies” or as “friends”). But at some point in his life, at a moment of a deep identity crisis, Ignatius started to discern between the forces that alienated him from himself and others on the one hand, and the love that allowed him to connect to himself and others on the other. He started to give up the game of “auto- and hetero-aggression” and found true self-respect and respect for others.

The spiritual exercise of Greg, former Porn Star

Greg, the most decorated male porn star of all time, follows in the footsteps of saints like Ignatius who entered the realm of “the life and love present in the Christ figure (among others)”. First of all, Greg became aware of the status he wanted to uphold, as a rich and famous adult film actor, and how this was destroying him. He ended up in an endless vicious circle:

“I had to go to work, to do the porn, so that I could buy the drugs, to bury the pain of doing the porn. So I’d go to work, and do the porn, so I could buy the drugs, to bury the pain. And around and around it went.”

Second, Greg realized what harm this kind of auto-aggression was doing to his ability to love other people:

“What porn did to me, is it changed the way I thought, and felt about women. I began to look at them even more so as a sexual object. I lost the ability to have a loving and caring relationship. I thought I was still able. I was fooled.”

Finally, however, Greg was able to turn away, to convert (Latin: “convertere”), and he transformed his life into a testimony and an example to inspire others:

“I left the set [of a shoot], drove a couple blocks, pulled over, and started crying. Since that day, I’ve never gone back. I changed my life, I began my life. You see, if I can change my heart, anybody can.”

What If Dirk Draulans Read René Girard?

by ERIK BUYS on February 8, 2016February 8, 2016

Dirk Draulans, biologist and science journalist for Belgian Knack magazine, wrote an interesting article on the question of violence in human life (Violence is deeply rooted in us – The biology of terror; PDF: Het geweld zit diep in ons – De biologie van terreur). He drew from several recent findings concerning the ongoing struggle with violence between and within human communities since prehistoric times. Perhaps not surprisingly, he came across questions as well as insights that are at the core of René Girard’s mimetic theory and its explanation of human culture. So I can only advice Draulans to read the work of René Girard and other scholars of mimetic theory. As I’ll try to show, it may resolve some of the ambiguities and dilemmas he touches upon in his article. I’ve translated parts of the article from Dutch, emphasizing certain sentences, before commenting from a Girardian point of view.

First of all, Draulans points to the importance of imitation or mimesis in the origin and maintenance of human culture:

Our culture is not in our genes, but is transmitted by copying and learning behavior.

In this context Draulans refers to a thought experiment conducted by scientists who specialize in the emergence of culture. More specifically, he refers to an article in New Scientist, Island of wild children: Would they learn to be human? (Christopher Kemp, June 3, 2015) that contains the experiment:

100 babies. No adults. One island. Without language, culture or tools, what would they become and how would their own children evolve?

Or, as Draulans puts it:

This led to the key question whether we humans are born violent.

Here’s how Draulans continues:

Quite a few scientists who participated in the thought experiment assumed that there soon would be tensions within the group, especially when food is scarce. Indeed, biologically speaking, violence is deeply rooted in us. Chimpanzees, who are models for the ape-men who were our ancestors, are ‘naturally’ violent. The world of chimpanzees is organized around the members of their own group, and neighboring groups are by definition enemies to be fought. Last year, Biological Reviews published an analysis of the skulls of australopithecines, chimpanzee-like ancestors of man who lived several million years ago. The results show that their hands were so evolved that they could easily make fists, not only for handling equipment but also to commit violence. Some skulls, especially of men, were hardened to better absorb punches. Yet in the course of our evolution we gradually became more gentle. We had to, if we wanted to survive in a world with ever more people, many of them we didn’t know. […] An average person would find groups of 150 people or more difficult to handle, for he wouldn’t know everyone personally.

[…]

Although culture and morality became very powerful in the course of our history, they could never prevent the resurgence of extreme violence. The Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences published a study of a 7,000 year old mass grave in Germany. It showed that dozens of people, including children, were brutally maimed and killed. It is not the only mass grave from that period. The question is whether the violence was provoked by famine, by the need for survival. It could just as well have been an expression of the expansion of one group at the expense of another, without any further information about the groups in question.

Scientists are struggling with the difficult balance between our propensity to violence on the one hand and our ability to cooperate on the other. This is shown by two books published last year. In A Talent for Friendship an American ethnographer develops the idea that so-called primitive tribes are not as violent as we were led to believe for a long time. On the contrary, they would have had systems to learn to accept strangers as friends […]. They would even have had ‘ritual battlefields’ to turn hostility into friendship. In another book, Virtuous Violence (CLICK HERE FOR A PRESENTATION IN SLIDES), both an American anthropologist and psychologist defend the surprising statement that violence often is not the result of a diminished moral sense, but rather the reverse: people sometimes use violence because they believe that it’s the best thing to do. They often feel ‘morally obliged’ to be violent.

[…]

‘Normal’ people can be victims of thinking in terms of one’s own group just as much as terrorists. It is a modern variant of the biological tribal feeling. If we can position ourselves as a group against another group, feelings of empathy easily erode as we cannot possibly sympathize with large numbers of strangers. People more easily commit violence in groups than on their own, partly because they then can evade personal responsibility. Research into activity of certain areas in the brain clearly revealed this. Thus our brains not always contribute to the accomplishment of a more livable world. That is not their concern. It should be possible with our culture, though. But unfortunately it is not always as powerful as it should be.

In a video compilation I made (on the origin of cultures) as an introduction to mimetic theory (click here), anthropologist David Watts filmed an event that normally doesn’t happen within groups of chimpanzees. True, chimpanzees often collectively inflict extreme violence on individual members of an outside community, but they would not do this to a member of their own community. And yet, that’s what Watts witnessed. It happened in the largest group that was ever observed in the wild, with over a 150 chimpanzees. Indeed, as Draulans writes, groups of 150 people or more become difficult to handle, and people no longer know each member of the group well. It is no surprise that chimpanzees experience similar problems in such a large group: tensions rise, and feelings of empathy are not as strong for every member. Interestingly, Yuval Noah Harari also stresses the critical threshold of 150 members in his bestseller Sapiens – A Brief History of Humankind (Part One, Chapter 2 The Tree of Knowledge – The Legend of Peugeot):

“In the wake of the Cognitive Revolution, gossip helped Homo sapiens to form larger and more stable bands. But even gossip has its limits. Sociological research has shown that the maximum ‘natural’ size of a group bonded by gossip is about 150 individuals. Most people can neither intimately know, nor gossip effectively about, more than 150 human beings.

Even today, a critical threshold in human organisations falls somewhere around this magic number.”

What Draulans only partly emphasizes in his article is the fact that violent tensions within and between groups of primates may also occur when ‘survival’ (of the individual or of the group as a ‘species’) is not exactly the issue. In groups of chimpanzees, males constantly vie for dominance and form frequently changing alliances in order to move up the hierarchy. This has to do with an increased mimetic ability. In many circumstances a group benefits from mimetic (i.e. imitative) ability as survival and other skills are more easily passed on from one member of the group to others, but in the context of mutually imitated desires the mimetic ability often leads to violent conflict. Even if there’s enough food and water for everybody, mimetic desire might cause violence as individuals do not want to share the objects of their desire (for an example of two babies fighting over two identical cans of coke that could easily be shared, click here). Collective violence of chimpanzees against individual members of an outside community thus also has a social function: it reunites normally competing males of the same group against a common enemy. This behavior forms the basis for the scapegoat mechanism in (primitive) human communities as it is described by René Girard.

It should come as no surprise that the rare event of collective violence against a member of one’s own group precisely occurred in an exceptional group of chimpanzees with over 150 members. Indeed: the bigger the group, the bigger the tensions, and the more individual members may fall outside ‘circles of empathy’, thus running the chance of becoming the victim of a ‘reuniting collective violence’. According to Girard, events of collective violence, releasing tensions within one’s own group, would have happened more in primitive human communities (as those became larger and as humans have even more mimetic ability and thus potentially destructive mimetic desires than other primates). This, again according to Girard, eventually resulted in rituals belonging to the first signs of human culture: ritual sacrifices (for more on Girard’s account on the origin of religion and ‘the sacred’, click here). These rituals try to distinguish so-called ‘good’, ‘justified’ or ‘regenerating’ violence from ‘bad’ or ‘destructive’ violence. For instance, in the Andes Tinku of Bolivia descendants of the Inca stage a festival called Tinku to receive a good harvest from ‘the mountain spirits’ (this is also shown in the video compilation, on the origin of cultures – click here for more). Almost every year someone dies during this ritual battle, that nevertheless still often ends in an embrace of the fighters. Indeed, this ritual sacrifice of human blood wants to turn potential destructive enmity over scarcity of food into the maintenance of peace because of a good harvest. Honoring the spirits in maintaining certain taboos and sacrifices prevents their wrath (perceived as some sort of supernatural punishment by the contagious disease of destructive violence). A recent study in Science (click here pdf) claims that beliefs like these were necessary to make societies socially and politically more complex: indeed, the establishment of periodic ritual sacrifices would release tensions in a more controlled, structured way.

As said, all these observations from mimetic theory may resolve some of the dilemmas in the article of Dirk Draulans as well as nuance some of his statements. Summarized:

1) Humans are not ‘naturally violent’. We don’t automatically feel nor need to suppress the urge to attack others. What is the case is that we are ‘naturally mimetic’ and that mimetic tendencies in the context of desire might lead to violent conflict (read also pdf The Two Sides of Mimesis by Vittorio Gallese). As Draulans observes, commenting on the study of a prehistoric mass grave:

The question is whether the violence was provoked by famine, by the need for survival. It could just as well have been an expression of the expansion of one group at the expense of another…

Even if there’s enough food and water for everybody, mimetic desire might cause violence as individuals do not want to share the objects of their desire (again for the aforementioned example of two babies fighting over two identical cans of coke that could easily be shared, click here). Humans sometimes even suppress instinctual needs and desires because of mimetically enhanced ambitions. Germany, for instance, entered the first world war as one of the most powerful nations in the world. It had no shortage of consumer products, let alone of basic food supplies and water. It mainly wanted to express its supremacy. Of course, tragically, Germany came out of the war as a broken nation (for more, click here). On an individual level, things like anorexia would not be possible if humans were mainly guided by their ‘natural needs’. Moreover, a recent study once again reveals what happens when mimetic desire is not kept in check by certain beliefs (“I have to accept my social position because of karma”) or taboos (“I cannot question the authority of my king because god will punish me if I do so”). The article of this study, in Nature (October 15, 2015), Conspicuous wealth undermines cooperation, concludes:

Wealth inequality and wealth visibility can both potentially affect levels of cooperation in a society and overall levels of economic success. Akihiro Nishi et al. use an online game to test how the two factors interact. Surprisingly, wealth inequality by itself did not damage cooperation or overall wealth as long as players do not know about the wealth of others. But when players’ wealth was visible to others, inequality had a detrimental effect.

2) Human culture (and morality – Draulans seems to use this term as a synonym) arises both as an attempt to suppress violence and as an attempt to justify so-called ‘necessary’ violence. Draulans refers to the ambiguity of ‘ritual battlefields’, which is in itself a way out of the dilemma of ‘cooperation vs violence’. Following René Girard and mimetic theory, basic cultural religious institutions such as ritual (sacrifices) allow for a fundamental distinction between so-called ‘good’ and ‘bad’ violence and provide individual members of human communities with the collective means to justify the violence they inflict on others. This justification is part of what Girard calls the scapegoat mechanism. As it provides ‘distinctions’, ‘definitions’ and ‘(psychological and social) identity’ against the threat of undifferentiated, ‘contagious’ violence, the scapegoat mechanism also forms the basis of human culture according to Girard. It might shed more light on this quote by Draulans:

‘Normal’ people can be victims of thinking in terms of one’s own group just as much as terrorists. It is a modern variant of the biological tribal feeling. If we can position ourselves as a group against another group, feelings of empathy easily erode as we cannot possibly sympathize with large numbers of strangers. People more easily commit violence in groups than on their own, partly because they then can evade personal responsibility. Research into activity of certain areas in the brain clearly revealed this. Thus our brains not always contribute to the accomplishment of a more livable world. That is not their concern.

René Girard portrait I guess ‘reason’ alone doesn’t make us human. There are ‘matters of the heart’ too, guiding us to use our brains not to build weapons of mass destruction but to build ‘bridges of solidarity’…

Anyway, Dirk, read René Girard!

Highly recommended:

How We Became Human – Mimetic Theory and the Science of Evolutionary Origins

How We Became Human

Dag gedichtendag

by ERIK BUYS on January 28, 2016January 28, 2016

Vroeger schreef ik ook wel eens een gedicht. Ter gelegenheid van gedichtendag heb ik mijn poëtische aspiraties even uit de kist gehaald. Ze blijken nog altijd springlevend van naïviteit, overdreven dramatiek, vaak uitgemolken clichés, ongegronde Sehnsucht en teen angst. Af en toe getuigen ze ook van een toevallig begenadigd moment, of van ongeremde experimenteerdrift. En dan worden ze toch nog een beetje interessant. Wat voorligt zijn enkele van de gedichten die door anderen goed genoeg bevonden werden om het tot laureaat van een of andere poëzieprijs te schoppen, voorgedragen te worden, of in een gelegenheidsuitgave opgenomen te worden. Ik verzamel ze nu hier, voor wat ze ook maar waard zijn. Misschien is er een toevallige lezer die ze wel kan smaken.

platonische liefde van een half uur en enkele minuten

jij kijkt naar mij
en ik naar jou.

of ik mijn ogen afwenden zou?
“mooi ben jij”

was het antwoord
van mijn ogen-blik.

en geen mens die hoort:
“ja, dat weet ik.”

gehaikud

druppels pletsen o-
pen op het modderpad, maar
ik schrijf nog niet dood.

Les Lyriek

muisje is in de tas
steunend op de vloer
huisje is in de klas

kreunend op de loer
staat hij naast het geknabbelde gaatje

nu spits een neusje wacht op het startsein
staat hij naast het bebabbelde paadje

nu flits een keusje wacht op het geweest-zijn

raas zoeft hij
voorbij
kaas, proeft hij
blij

de oversteek is gewaagd

de overwinning smaakt zoet
de kwajongensstreek is gevraagd

de trilling raakt bloed

toen gelach, tongen, gezangen, “naar huis” weerklonk
want de les was gegeven
toen zag de jongen, gevangen, een muis die al stonk
nodig voor de les Leven

uitgesproken

de telefoon rinkelt

jij weer, zeg ik

ja, zeg jij

je stem stokt
ik slik

nog de telefoon spreekt:
klik

moment

het warme weer
past niet bij dit kil gemoed,
de stralen van de zon
niet bij de leegte
van “geen wolkje aan de lucht”.

zo schijnt het.

maar een mens,
hij brandt een winter
slechts moeizaam op.

om (jou) te vergeten

mijn hand is gegroefd
van allerlei kwalen

die ik niet bedwong.
zij kruisen in schets
schrijfsels en papier
als krassen van raven
lachend om te mooie lucht.
‘t smaakt mij bitter, wrang
en gewoon: ‘k drink reeds lang,
zo wil het gerucht.
geen gerecht wil het staven,
nee, geen twijfels hier.
oordeel “scherp niet flets”
dat ik niet genoeg wrong

om jou te verdwalen:
ja, ik ben diep bedroefd.

te Val

sprong
over de val
glijdend van euvel
vallen in een dal

waar trappelend overeind gekomen
reeds wegzinkt in een moeras van bomen

struikel
in de strik
van een boom
gedraaid in struiken verstrikt

en schichtig voort-spartelend al loom
sluipt de slaap voor angstige blik:

de vogel vliegt
nooit meer nu
de slang haar prooi wiegt.

spiegelbeeld

mijn ware ik: wie ik wil zijn

taalfout
schets van een spiegel
rand van een scherf
gebroken in splinters
groeipijn
maar het staat en staart
ik wil bloeden
ik wil kerven
ik wil voelen
leven lopen
maar het staat en staart,
een overkant van wijd rivieren,
rijtlijn van een horizon;
papier tussen hemel en aarde

rust
wit
onrust

ware ik wie ik wil zijn
ik was dichter al ongeschreven

Mimetic Food Habits

by ERIK BUYS on January 25, 2016January 25, 2016

It would be very interesting to create an intensified dialogue between Paul Rozin‘s research on the acquisition of likes and dislikes of foods and René Girard’s mimetic theory. Although some scholars already made some connections between the two (for instance in Culinary Cultures of Europe: Identity, Diversity and Dialogue, ed. by Darra Goldstein & Kathrin Merkle, Council of Europe Publication, 2005), much promising work remains to be done.

bugpartywormeating Among other things, biology and psychology professor Paul Rozin conducted a research with children from 16 months to five years of age. This resulted in a paper first published in Appetite (7: 141-151; June 1986), The Child’s Conception of Food: Differentiation of Categories of Rejected Substances in the 16 Months to 5 Year Age Range (click for pdf). The abstract from the article:

Children (N = 54) ranging in age from one year four months to five years were offered over 30 items to eat. The items included normal adult foods and exemplars of different adult rejection categories: disgust (e.g. grasshopper, hair), danger (liquid dish soap), inappropriate (e.g. paper, leaf) and unacceptable combinations (e.g. ketchup and cookie). We report a high to moderate level of acceptance (item put into mouth) of substances from all of these categories in the youngest children. Acceptance of disgusting and dangerous substances decreases with increasing age, while acceptance of inappropriate substances remains at moderate levels across the age range studied. Although the youngest children accepted more disgust items, the majority rejected most of the disgust choices. Almost all children at all ages tested accept combinations of foods which, although individually accepted by adults, are rejected in combination. No significant differences were observed between ‘normal’ children and those with a history of toxin ingestion, although there was a tendency of ingesters to accept more inedible items. In general, the results suggest that a major feature of the development of food selection is learning what not to eat.

disgust “A major feature of the development of food selection is learning what not to eat.” In other words, disgust is not just a biological thing, a matter of nature. It is a cultural thing too, a matter of nurture. In yet other words, a huge part of our development concerning likes and dislikes of food lies in the imitation of others. If disgust is a matter of nurture it is also a matter of mimesis. Powerful social models have the potential to increase or decrease the disgust for certain foods. For instance, the disgust for organ meat is decreasing since it is increasingly perceived as food served to the beau monde in fancy restaurants. Organ meat thus becomes an object of mimetic desire, while at the beginning of the nineteenth century, it used to be something undesirable for the rich as it was “meat for the poor”.

Further considerations by Paul Rozin on the origin of disgust as a specifically human trait include the possibility that disgust arose around things that were (considered to be) contagious. Which brings us back to René Girard, whose mimetic theory could explain why things that are not actually contaminating on a purely biological, “natural” level are indeed considered disgusting to the extent that they were once associated with “contaminating” violence (on the “cultural” level).

Well, let’s explore!

culinary-cultures-of-europe-identity-diversity-and-dialogue

Milgram Obedience Study / Stanford Prison Experiment / Social Cognition / Robbers Cave Experiment

by ERIK BUYS on December 9, 2015December 9, 2015

Students of psychology would not be surprised by some of the key statements made by René Girard and his mimetic theory.

Indeed social psychology time and again shows how people’s social behavior and self-concepts are shaped by imitation processes and scapegoat mechanisms, as stressed by mimetic theory. For instance, Stanley Milgram’s obedience study and the Stanford Prison Experiment show how powerful individuals as well as socially established abstract norms of “role” models are easily obeyed (imitated). The attribution theory teaches how someone tends to “blame” circumstances to justify his or her own “bad” behavior, while, on the other hand, he or she tends to hold others personally responsible for their “loathsome” conduct. Apparently, others are not so easily excused and appear as convenient scapegoats. People who play the blame game consider their own behavior to be “very different” from similar behavior in others. Insights into social identities reveal how gaining an identity through conformity (again by imitating others, of course) leads to stereotyping of and competing with others (as common enemies and scapegoats of one’s group). Here also, there is a tendency to exaggerate differences between one’s own group and other groups. The conduct of one’s own group is easily justified, while similar conduct of a competing group is considered “unjust”. The problem, of course, is that competing groups imitate this reasoning for their own particular group and thus reinforce the rivalry between each other (read René Girard’s Battling to the End in this regard, on mimetic rivalry on a planetary scale – highly recommended!).

These are all but some preliminary considerations regarding the relationship between mimetic theory and social psychology. There is much more to explore in this relationship. So without further ado, in order to know where to start, here is a short overview of some basic studies and concepts of social psychology which relate directly to mimetic theory.

1. Stanley Milgram’s Obedience Study (click for more information)

Not surprisingly, in light of mimetic theory, disobedience is more likely to occur:

when the experimenter leaves the room
when the orders are given by an “ordinary” man
when the subject works with peers who refuse to go on
[considering the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas]
when the “learner” is in the same room

2. The Stanford Prison Experiment (Philip Zimbardo – click for more)

People adapt to the social norms of the role assigned to them. Prisoners become distressed, helpless and panicky. Guards become nice, or “tough but fair”, or tyrannical.

3. Social Cognition

Social cognition is an area of social psychology concerned with social influences on thought, memory, perception and all kinds of other cognitive processes. More specifically, researchers are interested in how people’s self-perception affects relationships, thoughts, beliefs and values. Here are some findings regarding attribution, factors in attitude change and conformity.

Attribution theory:

People are motivated to explain their own and others’ behavior by attributing its causes to situation or disposition. Again, not surprisingly in light of mimetic theory, people show the tendency to overestimate personality factors in explaining the behavior of others, while they underestimate situational influence. On the other hand, the concept of self-serving bias points to the fact that people often do the opposite when explaining their own behavior: people try to justify themselves.

Major factors in attitude change:

endorsement by an admired or attractive person
a leader who offers unconditional love, acceptance and attention
the creation of a new identity based on a group
repetition (imitation, indeed) of ideas and assertions; entrapment (justification of an escalating commitment); isolation from other sources of information

Conformity (click for more) (see also Solomon Asch, click here),

related to:

groupthink: in close-knit groups all members tend to think alike and suppress disagreement for the sake of harmony
diffusion of responsibility
bystander apathy
deindividuation (the loss of awareness of one’s own individuality in groups or crowds)
ethnocentrism
(aids survival by making people feel attached to and willing to work for their own group)
group identity and social identity
(a person’s self-concept based on an identification with a group, a nation or a culture, or with gender or other social roles)
“us vs. them” social identities that are strengthened when groups compete (in-group vs. out-group; see Muzafer Sherif and his Robbers Cave experiment)
stereotypes that distort reality for they:
exaggerate differences between groups and underestimate differences within groups; allow for disliking others so people feel closer to their own group and inflate self-worth

The Coach = An Easy Scapegoat

by ERIK BUYS on December 8, 2015December 8, 2015

Ruben Van Gucht, a Belgian sports journalist, did a little research on the question whether soccer teams really benefit from firing a coach and attracting a new one when a team is not delivering expected results. He presented his results on De Afspraak (December 8, 2015), a Belgian TV-show.

The short answer to Van Gucht’s research question is NO.

Similar research done in other countries already suggested this outcome.

Often there is a short-term effect, but this has more to do with statistical regularity, especially when considered from the perspective of long-term effects. Indeed, in the long run there seem to be no significant differences between the results under the guidance of the former coach and those of the new one.

Victories as well as defeats of soccer teams are just that: TEAM EFFORTS & EXPERIENCES. Of course it is tempting to look for a scapegoat in times of crisis. And coaches are easy targets. But as Van Gucht’s research reveals: a coach is not a decisive factor; he’s just one of many.

Coincidentally, I wrote about the tendency to use coaches as scapegoats in an introduction to my course on René Girard’s mimetic theory in high school. Here’s an excerpt:

The mimetic building blocks of our psycho-social fabric are at once responsible for the preservation and disintegration of that very same fabric. One of the well-tried means to restore a social order that is in crisis because of escalating mimetic rivalry, is the so-called scapegoat mechanism. This restoration again rests on mimetic processes. Let’s turn to the example of the soccer team once more. When a team loses time and again, that’s normally no favorable factor for the group atmosphere. Teammates start blaming each other for bad results, maybe even sabotaging each other. There also might be ill-will towards the coach by players who feel they’re not given enough opportunities to play matches. And when the coach becomes part of the rivalry and frustrations within the team, that’s usually the end of his career there. As more players imitate the ill-will of some teammates towards their coach, the latter becomes the one held responsible for all the major problems within the team, and he’ll be fired by the board in the end. Instead of recognizing the mimetic origins of social disorder, people tend to blame one outsider or a group of outsiders. This scenario is well-known. Coaches indeed often function as convenient scapegoats, as they are outsiders because of their position of leadership, and they are easily blamed unjustly for a crisis they’re not or only partly responsible for. Like other scapegoats they’re interpreted in a twofold manner by the group they’re expelled from: perceived as the main cause for the tensions, divisions and disorder within the group, and experienced as the main cure while being sacrificed (expelled, or worse) to restore unity and order within that same group. Scapegoats are at once villain and hero, monster and savior, hated and loved, unwanted and wanted, scorned yet needed. Think, for example, of dictatorial regimes who blame all their domestic problems on foreign enemies. As long as a dictator can unite his citizens against some outside enemy, he can at least prevent them from uniting against himself and remain in the saddle. This means that he cannot completely destroy the enemy he publicly loathes. Dictators need the periodic sacrifice of their scapegoat in order to preserve the social fabric on a very large scale, but human beings in general tend to use the scapegoat mechanism on a day-to-day basis, albeit often in smaller ways.