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In times of financial and economic crisis people seem more susceptible to unrealistic promises of immediate wealth. Indeed, more people play the lottery, losing more money while desperately trying to get rich. Tragic.

advertising on tv and mimesis cartoonBut even when people do win the lottery, chances of a happier and more fulfilling life are not guaranteed. This becomes clear in a documentary, made by the Belgian television network RTBF (from the French speaking part of the country). Lottery winners fall in between because of myriad mimetic interplays. People dream of living the good life like the jetset. When they are finally able to imitate that kind of life, they are not at ease with the culture of the rich and famous. At the same time they often fall victim to the jealousy of their peers. It’s easier to admire those who do not belong to your own social environment than those who are close to you. It’s – as René Girard would have it – a mimetic law, which Plato already refers to in his dialogue Lysis (215d) when Socrates says:

“By a universal and infallible law the nearer any two things resemble each other, the fuller do they become of envy, strife and hatred…”

Or, as Jesus puts it in the Gospel (Mark 6:4):

“A prophet is not without honor except in his own town, among his relatives and in his own home.”

I thought of these insights while watching the documentary Les millionnaires de hasard-lotto. Watch it here.

But I also thought of it when I heard one of my friends complain about the fact that Muslim girls apparently could wear a veil in a photograph for some official banking documents, while at the same time and place “ordinary Flemish girls” could not wear a headband… Well, that’s a major problem, isn’t it? Anyway, it’s true after all that the biblical story of Cain and Abel keeps on reflecting a very basic aspect of this world order…

Reading tip: Les Millionnaires de la chance. Rêve et réalité, Michel Pinçon et Monique Pinçon-Charlot.

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In het tv-programma Reyers Laat van 2 mei 2013 werd speciale aandacht besteed aan… de Liefde.

Reyers LoveAls godsdienstleraar vind ik het interessant om te zien hoe een aantal inzichten die behoren tot de kern van het joods-christelijke denken ook aanwezig zijn in een seculiere context. Dat is niet zo verwonderlijk. Het gaat in de Bijbel, zoals in iedere grote spirituele traditie, om een zoektocht naar de uiteindelijke bestemming van mens en wereld, en die zoektocht vertrekt vanuit een karakterisering van “de mens”. Blijkbaar komen de pogingen van de Bijbelse auteurs om de mens en zijn voornaamste problematieken te karakteriseren overeen met de pogingen van hedendaagse menswetenschappers die hetzelfde doen. Bovendien verwijst psychiater Dirk De Wachter naar Emmanuel Levinas, een Franse filosoof inderdaad, maar vooral ook een joodse denker (ook bekend om zijn lezingen van de Talmoed). En dan is het natuurlijk al helemaal niet toevallig dat een Bijbelse antropologie doorklinkt in het spreken van dokter De Wachter. Het bleek voor de leerlingen uit de 6GRWIb, 6LAWIb, 6ECMT1, 6ECWI en 6ECWE aan wie ik vandaag lesgaf helemaal niet moeilijk om de overeenkomsten tussen de boodschap van de evangeliën en die van Clara Cleymans, Kristien Hemmerechts en Dirk De Wachter aan te duiden. Dank aan Reyers Laat voor het onverwachte didactische materiaal :)! Klik aan:

BEKIJK HIER EEN FRAGMENT: WAT IS LIEFDE?

En voor wie wil weten hoe een godsdienstleraar een en ander over de liefde beschouwt vanuit het Nieuwe Testament, is er volgende link – een inkijk in mijn lessen :), jawel – klik aan:

VAN EROS NAAR THANATOS NAAR AGAPÈ (PDF)

In mijn boek, uitgegeven bij Averbode in 2009, worden deze thema’s verder uitgewerkt – klik hier voor meer informatie over Vrouwen, Jezus en rock-‘n-roll.

sacrificial peaceTot slot geef ik nog enkele citaten uit het gesprek. Wie het pdf-document gelezen heeft, zal merken dat de nieuwtestamentische opvatting over vrede aansluit bij de karakterisering van de liefde in het gesprek uit Reyers Laat.

De Jezusfiguur van de canonieke evangeliën heeft het niet zo begrepen op een “vrede” of “harmonie” die gebaseerd is op offers, op geweld. Hij heeft het niet begrepen op een slaafse gehoorzaamheid of blinde loyauteit aan een eigen “(familie)clan”, waarbij “de vijand” van die clan automatisch de vijand wordt van eenieder die ertoe behoort, zonder dat de vraag gesteld wordt of de clan het wel bij het rechte eind heeft.

I did not come to bring peaceDe Jezusfiguur uit de canonieke evangeliën plaatst een vraagteken bij relaties waarin conflicten niet op een vruchtbare wijze aan bod kunnen komen. Mensen kunnen pas “thuis” zijn bij elkaar als ze ook het verschil tussen zichzelf en anderen een plaats kunnen geven – en verschillen in opvattingen en persoonlijkheden zullen onvermijdelijk spanningen teweegbrengen; de kunst is om er op een creatieve manier mee om te gaan. Jezus brengt “het zwaard”, maar het is wel duidelijk dat hij dit niet letterlijk bedoelt als een oproep tot geweld – zie Mt10,34-36: “Denk niet dat Ik op aarde vrede ben komen brengen. Ik ben geen vrede komen brengen, maar een zwaard. Want Ik ben gekomen om een wig te drijven tussen zoon en vader, tussen dochter en moeder, tussen schoondochter en schoonmoeder; ja, huisgenoten worden vijanden.”

Put away your swordKortom, de Jezusfiguur uit de canonieke evangeliën pleit vóór de mogelijkheid van conflicten (als vruchtbare spanningen voortkomende uit het verschil tussen mensen), maar is tégen gewelddadige conflicten.

Enkele citaten uit het gesprek in Reyers Laat ‘Reyers Love’ (2 mei 2013)

Dirk De Wachter: “Mijn stelling is dat de duurzame liefde – niet de verliefdheid of het hormonale gebeuren – bestaat uit het erkennen van de ander als ander. Dat juist in het verschil, het onoverbrugbare verschil, de continuïteit zich stelt. Dat is een theorie die ik niet zelf heb uitgevonden, maar die komt van de Franse filosoof Levinas. Dus: de ander als ander, de ander niet willen veranderen; de ander niet willen maken tot wat ge zelf zou wensen, tot uw eigen beeld of verlangen, maar de ander ‘laten zijn’.

Hoe kan men de ander beminnen zonder hem of haar tot zijn bezit te maken? […] De geliefde wordt vandaag vaak beschouwd als een soort consumptieproduct – als iets dat men zich kan aanschaffen en dan naar zijn verlangen kan modelleren, en dan ook opzij zetten als het niet meer echt voldoet aan dat wat men zo graag zou hebben.

Het is bijna een noodzaak. Het is omdat de ander anders is dat er steeds een verlangen blijft. Het is in die onvervuldheid dat we steeds blijven doorgaan. Dat is de paradox.”

Clara Cleymans: “Liefde stoelt altijd op eigenliefde. Daar wil ik niet mee zeggen dat liefde zich zou baseren op egoïsme of narcisme, want dat staat daar natuurlijk haaks tegenover, maar wel dat ge uzelf moet respecteren en uzelf ergens moet graag zien om de juiste partner te vinden of om ‘juist’ lief te hebben.”

Dirk De Wachter: “Dat is zeer juist. Als de ander moet dienen om u goed te voelen, dan zit ge met een probleem. Maar als ge u goed voelt, en de ander kan ook zichzelf zijn, dan is er duurzaamheid – niet gegarandeerd want dat bestaat niet – mogelijk.”

Clara Cleymans: “Als ge uzelf niet graag ziet, dan kunt ge ook heel moeilijk alleen zijn, en dan vlucht ge vaak in iemands armen; en als liefde een vlucht wordt dan houdt het op om liefde te zijn. […] Ik denk dat elke relatie mis kan gaan bij een lage eigenwaarde, omdat het zo een lelijke symptomen heeft. Ge wordt vaak heel jaloers, ge wordt heel bezitterig, heel hebberig… Ge laat helemaal geen vrijheid naar uw partner toe. Maar ook, als ge uzelf niet goed voelt, dan bouwt ge soms een hele dikke stugge muur rondom u, en dan kunt ge niet in een relatie stappen want een relatie is juist een hele intieme vorm van communicatie – waar ge iemand toelaat in uw meest intieme, hyperpersoonlijke ruimte, en ge hebt een soort van openheid nodig daarvoor.”

Kristien Hemmerechts: “Je mag niet afhankelijk zijn van iemand. Je moet je eerst goed in je eigen vel voelen voordat je een relatie kan aangaan. Want anders ga je die ander gebruiken om dat gat in jou te vullen, om die leegte in jou te vullen.”

Als mensen elkaar niet herleiden tot een louter middel ter bevrediging van bepaalde behoeftes en verlangens, kunnen ze het onuitwisbare verschil tussen zichzelf en anderen op het spoor komen dat liefde mogelijk maakt als respect voor de ander als ander. Christenen herkennen daarin de werkzame tegenwoordigheid van de Geest Gods, die uit de gespletenheid van het verschil het scheppende Woord baart dat een mens tot zijn medemens spreekt.


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One of today’s more popular philosophers, Alain de Botton, could easily have dubbed his TED-talk “A short history of  human self-understanding in the West according to René Girard”, but settled for “A kinder, gentler philosophy of success” instead.

alain-de-botton-on-rene-girardI accidently saw this talk on Belgian television (Canvas) and immediately suspected Girard’s influence. As it turns out, Alain de Botton rates Girard’s Deceit, Desire and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure five stars out of five on goodreads. No coincidence there…

CLICK TO WATCH:

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Of course, both de Botton and Girard are intellectual omnivores, drawing from similar sources (for instance, de Botton mentions Émile Durkheim in his talk; according to Eric Gans, “In particular, Durkheim should be considered the principal theoretical ancestor of René Girard’s notion of the sacred”). Nevertheless, it’s easy to pinpoint the many parts in de Botton’s talk that correspond with Girard’s preoccupations, even on a structural level. Here’s a comparison…

1. GLOBAL SNOBBERY

blog snobberyOne of René Girard’s main concepts is mimetic desire, i.e. desire based on the imitation (or mimesis) of the desire of others. Beyond instinctive needs and appetites, human desire is highly structured by mimetic interactions. We desire and attach importance to certain aspects of our environment because those others whom we experience as meaningful to our lives attach importance to these aspects, and we tend to imitate them. We gain a sense of identity as subjects by comparing ourselves to others who function as models (or mediators) for our desires and ambitions. So, from this angle, objects (or objectives) of desire are not intrinsically important. They gain value because of certain mediators they’re associated with, and because of the sense of being this association promises.

social-media-snobbery-venn-diagramDue to our mimetic tendencies we are able to imagine others’ viewpoints, to mimic others and to pretend we are like them. It also enables us to discover what those others focus on and what they seem to consider important. Imitating and obtaining what others consider important gives us social recognition, which in turn indeed gives us a sense of identity. We often don’t want material goods per se, we only want them insofar as they evoke social recognition – in the shape of admiration or envy by others. Snobbery grows out of the triangular structure of desire (i.e. the mimetic interplay between subject, model and object). Consumed by envious vanity himself, the snob is someone who desires others to admire or envy (even hate) him. He is an imitator who secretly wants to present himself as a model. The snob is someone who desperately seeks social respectability, in whatever context (be it a sports club, a school, a law firm, a factory, a family, an opera house, a newspaper etc.). In a way, we’re all snobs. We do care about what ‘meaningful others’ think of us! René Girard puts it this way (Deceit, Desire and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure – Translated by Yvonne Freccero, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966; 24):

“The triangular structure is no less obvious in social snobbism than it is in love-jealousy. The snob is also an imitator. He slavishly copies the person whose birth, fortune, or stylishness he envies. … The snob does not dare trust his own judgment, he desires only objects desired by others. That is why he is the slave of the fashionable. For the first time, moreover, we come across a term in current usage, ‘snobbism,’ which does not conceal the truth of triangular desire. Just to call a desire snobbish is enough to underscore its imitative character. The mediator is no longer hidden; the object is relegated to the background for the very reason that snobbism is not limited to a particular category of desires. One can be a snob in aesthetic pleasure, in intellectual life, in clothes, food etc.”

COMPARE ALL THIS WITH Alain de Botton’s description of job snobbery and the main reason why we want certain material goods (indeed because we think they’ll reward us with social respectability):

beer snob“Snobbery is a global phenomenon. … What is a snob? A snob is anybody who takes a small part of you and uses that to come to a complete vision of who you are. That is snobbery. The dominant kind of snobbery that exists nowadays is job snobbery. You encounter it within minutes at a party, when you get asked that famous iconic question of the early 21st century, ‘What do you do?’ And according to how you answer that question, people are either incredibly delighted to see you, or look at their watch and make their excuses. … Most people make a strict correlation between how much time, and if you like, love – not romantic love, though that may be something – but love in general, respect, they are willing to accord us, that will be strictly defined by our position in the social hierarchy.

And that’s a lot of the reason why we care so much about our careers and indeed start caring so much about material goods. You know, we’re often told that we live in very materialistic times, that we’re all greedy people. I don’t think we are particularly materialistic. I think we live in a society which has simply pegged certain emotional rewards to the acquisition of material goods. It’s not the material goods we want. It’s the rewards we want. And that’s a new way of looking at luxury goods. The next time you see somebody driving a Ferrari don’t think, ‘This is somebody who is greedy.’ Think, ‘This is somebody who is incredibly vulnerable and in need of love.’ Feel sympathy, rather than contempt.”

Alain de Botton also refers to mimetic mechanisms and mimetic desire:

“The thing about a succesful life is, a lot of the time, our ideas of what it would mean to live successfully are not our own. They are sucked in from other people…

And we also suck in messages from everything from the television, to advertising, to marketing, etc. These are hugely powerful forces that define what we want and how we view ourselves. When we’re told that banking is a very respectable profession a lot of us want to go into banking. When banking is no longer so respectable, we lose interest in banking. We are highly open to suggestion.”

2. MODERN EGALITARIANISM AND THE SPIRIT OF ENVY

Envy between the DeadOne of the main problems in the course of human history has been the potential destructive outcome of mimetic desire. If a mediator is at a great distance, the risks of (violent) rivalry between subject and model are not that big. There will often be a sense of admiration (idolatry) from the part of the subject towards its model. René Girard calls this kind of mimetic interplay external mediation. However, if the mediator is a close neighbor, relative or friend, risks of conflict grow increasingly. This so-called internal mediation makes the model of desire also an obstacle. When two (or more) people mutually enforce each other’s desire for certain objects (by way of imitation the model also becomes the imitator of his imitator, his double), envious rivalry emerges.

Premodern societies developed systems of taboos and (sacrificial) rituals to guide mimetic interactions and to prevent mimetic rivalry (and everything it’s associated with) from destabilizing communities. Moreover, there was a hierarchy in society as a matter of principle. One could not just aspire to the positon of a king when one was not of noble birth. This type of hierarchy was eventually justified by reference to ‘higher powers’ – fate, fortune, the gods… Myths were basically tales that defended the way societies structured themselves. People were ultimately not responsible for ‘the way of the world’ and for their own and others’ lives. God (or Fate) was to be thanked or to be blamed for whatever happened. God was the convenient scapegoat. People could not imitate the position of their king because God wouldn’t allow it. Respecting the social hierarchy (enforced by divine, ‘natural’ law) was a way to prevent mimetic rivalry and violent conflict. The French and other revolutions basically destroyed premodern hierarchical principles and their justifications in the western world, making way for modern democracy.

Wolfgang Palaver points to the potential dangers of modern equality in his book on René Girard’s mimetic theory (René Girard’s Mimetic Theory – Translated by Gabriel Borrud, Michigan State University Press, 2013; 61-62):

“Girard’s insight into the potential for conflict that accompanies internal mediation can help us better understand our modern, increasingly egalitarian world. As the metaphysical distance between desiring subject and model diminishes – the key component of internal mediation – the potential for rivalry and violence increases. The more negligible this distance becomes, the more probable it is that mimesis will end in rivalry and violence. The ancient proverbial truth found in mythical texts, primitive practices, and even the Bible, that brothers or sisters are much more prone to rivalry and conflict than others, can be easily understood with the help of Girard’s insight.

The development of mimetic desire from Cervantes to Dostoyevsky reflects the emergence of the modern world, one in which the spread of democracy and equality have meant the vanishing of rigid hierarchical differences. The limits on mimesis have essentially disappeared, as internal mediation increasingly takes the place of external mediation. The modern world has in turn seen a surge in competition, envy, and rivalry. In Girard’s eyes, this development is described most precisely by the French sociologist Alexis de Tocqueville in his work Democracy in America:

‘When all the privileges of birth and fortune are abolished, when all professions are accessible to all, and a man’s own energies may place him at the top of any of them, an easy and unbounded career seems open to his ambition and he will readily persuade himself that he is born to no common destinies. But this is an erroneous notion, which is corrected by daily experience. The same equality that allows every citizen to conceive these lofty hopes, renders all the citizens less able to realize them; it circumscribes their powers on every side, which it gives freer scope to their desires. … They have swept away the privilege of some of their fellow-creatures which stood in their way, but they have opened the door to universal competition.’

James on EnvyTocqueville is cognizant of the dangers posed by the modern phenomenon of equality. The strength of his analysis lies merely at the political level, however, in that he avoids pursuing the deeper anthropological roots of modern egalitarianism and the dangers it poses to society. Girard’s insight into the effects of mimetic desire allows one to understand why the phenomenon of equality – or the disappearance of social differences – poses these dangers. Reactionary or anti-egalitarian movements, in their attempt to maintain social differences, are aware of the conflictual potential of equality. 

One gains a sense of this from the contemporary struggle between the sexes, and the phenomenon of democracy. On the one hand, the equality of the sexes and political equality enhance moral quality in human relations, but, on the other hand, they also increase the possibility of rivalry, competition, and violence. Antje Vollmer, for one, points out in her book Heisser Frieden [Hot Peace] that modern equality is one of the major factors responsible for this increase in social violence.

The workings of mimetic desire, meanwhile, explain the problematic consequences of equality. We will see in the following sections that Girard’s theory of mimetic desire only offers an initial and preliminary answer to modern social dynamics. In his eyes, social differences are not God-given or a product of nature – as Aristotle and his conservative followers contend – but rather a product of mimesis. Just as Heraclitus saw social differences as a product of war – ‘the father and king of all, … some it makes gods, others men; some slaves, and others free’ – Girard also maintains that these distinctions result from the violence of mimetic rivalry.”

Envy the Sin No One ConfessesGirard also refers to Max Scheler in describing the dominant feelings that arise from the idea that anyone can achieve as much as everybody else, and the confrontation with the reality that this is practically impossible: ressentiment and envy. René Girard in his own words (A Theater of Envy: William Shakespeare, New York: Oxford UP, 1991; 4):

“We often brag that no word can scandalize us anymore, but what about ‘envy’? Our supposedly insatiable appetite for the forbidden stops short of envy. Primitive cultures fear and repress envy so much that they have no word for it; we hardly use the one we have, and this fact must be significant. We no longer prohibit many actions that generate envy, but silently ostracize whatever can remind us of its presence in our midst. Psychic phenomena, we are told, are important in proportion to the resistance they generate toward revelation. If we apply this yardstick to envy as well as to what psychoanalysis designates as repressed, which of the two will make the more plausible candidate for the role of best-defended secret?”

Envy indeed often is a big taboo, and Girard also further explains why we might be ashamed to admit that we are jealous:

“Envy subordinates a desired something to the someone who enjoys a privileged relationship with it. Envy covets the superior being that neither the someone nor the something alone, but the conjunction of the two, seems to possess. Envy involuntarily testifies to a lack of being that puts the envious to shame… That is why envy is the hardest sin to acknowledge.”

COMPARE ALL THIS WITH the way Alain de Botton tackles these issues:

“There are other reasons why it’s perhaps harder now to feel calm than ever before. One of these, and it’s paradoxical because it’s linked to something that’s rather nice, is the hope we all have for our careers. Never before have expectations been so high about what human beings can achieve with their lifespan. We’re told, from many sources, that anyone can achieve anything. We’ve done away with the caste system. We are now in a system where anyone can rise to any position they please. And it’s a beautiful idea. Along with that is a kind of spirit of equality. We’re all basically equal. There are no strictly defined kind of hierarchies.

Invidia (Envy) by Hieronymus BoschThere is one really big problem with this, and that problem is envy. Envy, it’s a real taboo to mention envy, but if there is one dominant emotion in modern society, that is envy. And it’s linked to the spirit of equality. Let me explain. I think it would be very unusual for anyone here, or anyone watching, to be envious of the Queen of England. Even though she is much richer than any of you are. And she’s got a very large house. The reason why we don’t envy her is because she’s too weird. She’s simply too strange. We can’t relate to her. She speaks in a funny way. She comes from an odd place. So we can’t relate to her. And when you can’t relate to somebody, you don’t envy them.

The closer two people are, in age, in background, in the process of identification, the more there is a danger of envy – which is incidentally why none of you should ever go to a school reunion – because there is no stronger reference point than people one was at school with. But the problem, generally, of modern society, is that it turns the whole world into a school. Everybody is wearing jeans, everybody is the same. And yet, they’re not. So there is a spirit of equality, combined with deep inequalities. Which makes for a very – can make for a very stressful situation.

It’s probably as unlikely that you would nowadays become as rich and famous as Bill Gates, as it was unlikely in the 17th century that you would accede to the ranks of the French aristocracy. But the point is, it doesn’t feel that way. It’s made to feel, by magazines and other media outlets, that if you’ve got energy, a few bright ideas about technology, a garage, you too could start a major thing.”

3. WHO’S TO BLAME?

FROM BAD FORTUNE TO FAILURE: THE SCAPEGOAT MECHANISM’S NEW CLOTHES

According to René Girard, but also atheists like French historian Marcel Gauchet, the Judeo-Christian traditions are highly responsible for the process of secularization in the West. Girard claims that the biblical writings gradually reveal the scapegoat mechanism as the cornerstone of archaic religion and culture, thereby potentially destroying faith in the gods who are considered responsible for the way the human world ‘works’ – with its different systems of taboos and rituals, and its periodic justification of certain sacrifices and victimary mechanisms. I’ll repeat what I’ve stated before:

Premodern societies developed systems of taboos and (sacrificial) rituals to guide mimetic interactions and to prevent mimetic rivalry (and everything it’s associated with) from destabilizing communities. Moreover, there was a hierarchy in society as a matter of principle. One could not just aspire to the positon of a king when one was not of noble birth. This type of hierarchy was eventually justified by reference to ‘higher powers’ – fate, fortune, the gods… Myths were basically tales that defended the way societies structured themselves. People were ultimately not responsible for ‘the way of the world’ and for their own and others’ lives. God (or Fate) was to be thanked or to be blamed for whatever happened. God was the convenient scapegoat. People could not imitate the position of their king because God wouldn’t allow it. Respecting the social hierarchy (enforced by divine, ‘natural’ law) was a way to prevent mimetic rivalry and violent conflict.

Due to the Judeo-Christian influence secularized societies no longer have an automatic access to the god(s) of archaic religion. Historically, sometimes this god was identified as the Christian God, although theologically one could argue – together with Girard and others – that Christ’s God fundamentally criticizes the mechanisms which produce the archaic sacred. Although the realm of the traditional sacred seems to have vanished in secularized societies, the mimetic and sacrificial mechanisms that lie behind it are still at work – alive as ever in human life. We simply bow to other idols. Often that’ll be the image that we have learned to desire for ourselves, the image which seems to give us social recognition…

One of the main sources of psychological problems nowadays is the idea that we are masters of our own lives, that we are fully responsible for our lives. So, secularized human beings no longer blame the gods for the bad things they encounter, they tend to blame themselves. They become their own scapegoat, their own sacrifice. People in secularized societies more and more sacrifice themselves (in all sorts of auto-aggressive behavior, from automutilation to suicide) if they’re not able to attain the image of ‘winner’ they secretly desire for themselves.

COMPARE ALL THIS WITH the following part of Alain de Botton’s talk:

“There is another reason why we might be feeling more anxious, about our careers, about our status in the world today, than ever before. And it is, again, linked to something nice, and that nice thing is called meritocracy.

meritocracyEverybody, all politicians on Left and Right, agree that meritocracy is a great thing, and we should all be trying to make our societies really, really meritocratic. In other words, what is a meritocratic society? A meritocratic society is one in which if you’ve got talent and energy and skill, you will get to the top. Nothing should hold you back. It’s a beautiful idea. The problem is if you really believe in a society where those who merit to get to the top, get to the top, you’ll also, by implication, and in a far more nasty way, believe in a society where those who deserve to get to the bottom also get to the bottom and stay there. In other words, your position in life comes to seem not accidental, but merited and deserved. And that makes failure seem much more crushing.

You know, in the Middle Ages, in England, when you met a very poor person, that person would be described as an ‘unfortunate’ – literally, somebody who had not been blessed by fortune, an unfortunate. Nowadays, particularly in the United States, if you meet someone at the bottom of society, they may unkindly be described as a ‘loser.’ There is a real difference between an unfortunate and a loser, and that shows 400 years of evolution in society and our belief in who is responsible for our lives. It’s no longer the gods, it’s us. We’re in the driving seat.

That’s exhilarating if you’re doing well, and very crushing if you’re not. It leads, in the worst cases, in the analysis of a sociologist like Émile Durkheim, it leads to increased rates of suicide. There are more suicides in developed individualistic countries than in any other part of the world. And some of the reason for that is that people take what happens to them extremely personally. They own their success. But they also own their failure.”

4. THE COMFORT OF TRAGEDY (AND COMEDY)

hero or villainOur heroes, our idols, our ‘gods’ – the ones we have a love-hate relationship with -, function, in the words of René Girard, as model/obstacle. On the one hand, we tend to imitate them and to model our desires and ambitions on their desires and ambitions. However, when we can’t seem to achieve what we’ve learned to hope for our own lives, the comparison with the ‘winners’ in society – the rich, the bright, the famous etc. – might turn ugly. Admiration can be the forerunner of envy, whereby we experience our models simultaneously as obstacles to our own success. You know, “Why should they have all the glory?” That’s why we like to read, hear and see stories of ‘fallen heroes’ from time to time. The little and big scandals that surround the ‘happy few’ comfort the great lot of us with the thought that “they’re not that fabulous after all.”

stand up comedian jesterIf we see that they’re human beings just like ourselves, they might evoke pity, and empathizing with their fate might help us to cope with the trials and tribulations in our own lives. If we perceive them as villains or even ‘monsters’, following the downfall of a former ‘winner’ might be a form of retribution or even ‘revenge’ for the fact that most of us don’t belong to that special caste of ‘high society’. Indeed, we’re part of the masses instead. In short, tragic stories of fallen heroes often comfort us with the idea that we are spared the fate of having to submit to the judgment of ‘public opinion’. Stand-up comedians are the jesters of the day, ventilating this opinion. Their presence is all the more important in a society like ours, in the West, where we need to ridicule all those seemingly important famous people we secretly envy… The more hidden and suppressed envy, the more need for today’s jesters, laughing at our contemporary ‘kings’ and ‘queens’. The comic is but the other side of the coin of comfort to which also the tragic belongs.

So, basically, there are two types of tragic stories: the scandalous or ‘mythical’ one that tends to present former heroes as ‘monsters’ (or vice versa!), and the actual tragedy which aims more at telling the story of the fallen hero in such a way that it enables the compassion of an audience.

Anyway, the periodic sacrifice of our (monstrous) idols, told and retold in our myths and tragedies, saves and restores our sense of identity and self-worth. It’s no surprise then that former villains can become heroes again after they’ve died, as they are experienced as saviours. They often generate a cult following, which reminds us of the cleansing and structuring effect mythologized heroes/villains like Billy the Kid bestow on ever new generations.

Tragedy and Comedy MasksRobert Hamerton-Kelly very succinctly points to the origin of Greek tragedy in a presentation of René Girard’s mimetic theory. It explains how tragic stories function and help take away conflictual tensions and frustrations in our human society, to this day:

“Greek tragedy originated as a religious ritual that facilitated self-cleansing and emotional renewal…”

COMPARE ALL THIS WITH Alain de Botton’s words on tragedy:

“There is another source of solace and comfort for all this. When we think about failing in life, when we think about failure, one of the reasons why we fear failing is not just a loss of income, a loss of status. What we fear is the judgment and ridicule of others. And it exists.

tabloid heroYou know, the number one organ of ridicule nowadays, is the newspaper. And if you open the newspaper any day of the week, it’s full of people who’ve messed up their lives. They’ve slept with the wrong person. They’ve taken the wrong substance. They’ve passed the wrong piece of legislation. Whatever it is. And then are fit for ridicule. In other words, they have failed. And they are described as ‘losers.’ Now is there any alternative to this? I think the Western tradition shows us one glorious alternative, and that is tragedy.

Tragic art, as it developed in the theaters of ancient Greece, in the fifth century B.C., was essentially an art form devoted to tracing how people fail, and also according them a level of sympathy, which ordinary life would not necessarily accord them. I remember a few years ago, I was thinking about all this, and I went to see ‘The Sunday Sport’, a tabloid newspaper that I don’t recommend you to start reading if you’re not familiar with it already. I went to talk to them about certain of the great tragedies of Western art. I wanted to see how they would seize the bare bones of certain stories if they came in as a news item at the news desk on a Saturday afternoon.

So I told them about Othello. They had not heard of it but were fascinated by it. And I asked them to write the headline for the story of Othello. They came up with ‘Love-Crazed Immigrant Kills Senator’s Daughter’ splashed across the headline. I gave them the plotline of Madame Bovary. Again, a book they were enchanted to discover. And they wrote ‘Shopaholic Adulteress Swallows Arsenic After Credit Fraud.’ And then my favorite. They really do have a kind of genius all of their own, these guys. My favorite is Sophocles’ Oedipus the King: ‘Sex With Mum Was Blinding.’

In a way, if you like, at one end of the spectrum of sympathy, you’ve got the tabloid newspaper. At the other end of the spectrum you’ve got tragedy and tragic art, and I suppose I’m arguing that we should learn a little bit about what’s happening in tragic art. It would be insane to call Hamlet a loser. He is not a loser, though he has lost. And I think that is the message of tragedy to us, and why it’s so very, very important, I think.”

5. A GLIMPSE OF JUDEO-CHRISTIAN REVELATION

The Envious (quote by Baltasar Gracian SJ)I’d like to end this post with a final quote from Alain de Botton, when he refers to Saint Augustine. It comes from the core of Judeo-Christian revelation, and it’s no coincidence – and this becomes even clearer if you’re familiar with René Girard’s rephrasing of the Christian tradition:

“I’m drawn to a lovely quote by St. Augustine in ‘The City of God,’ where he says, ‘It’s a sin to judge any man by his post.’ In modern English that would mean it’s a sin to come to any view of who you should talk to dependent on their business card. It’s not the post that should count. According to St. Augustine, it’s only God who can really put everybody in their place. … In other words, hold your horses when you’re coming to judge people. You don’t necessarily know what someone’s true value is. That is an unknown part of them. And we shouldn’t behave as though it is known.”

In still other words: it’s a sin to waste your life merely as a snob…

Theologically speaking, we’re not just children or ‘products’ of our social surroundings. We’re also ‘children of God’…

There is no saint without a past (Augustine of Hippo)

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An interesting and funny experiment is the now well-known fairness study by Dutch ethologist Frans de Waal and his colleagues.

WATCH IT HERE:

The Age of Empathy (by Frans de Waal)It once again confirms some basic intuitions of mimetic theory. Frans de Waal seems to treat the tendency to be competitive and aggressive on the one hand, and the tendency to be empathic on the other, as two different faculties. Seen from René Girard’s mimetic theory both competition and empathy can be attributed to one and the same source: mimesis (imitation).

  1. The ability to imitate another (see: mirror neurons or mirror neuron system!) opens up the possibility to imagine what the other is experiencing – as an “alter ego”. This is the foundation for the development of empathy and compassion.
  2. René Girard also points to mimesis as a potentially divisive force in the context of desire: when two individuals imitate each other’s desire for acquiring one and the same object, they can become each other’s rival. Mimetic desire thus threatens the stability of relationships.

In the words of Vittorio Gallese, one of the discoverers of mirror neurons, in conclusion to his paper The Two Sides of Mimesis (click title to read the whole paper): “We have examined empirical results showing how interpersonal relations are made possible — in the first place — by resonance mechanisms that provide the common ground upon which the I–Thou relation can be established. It could be tempting to use such evidence to assert the neurobiological basis of the supposed natural proclivity of mankind to sympathy, fellow feelings, good will and altruism. I think we must resist such temptation, and look at human nature as it really is and not as we would like it to be. In this respect, Girard’s Mimetic Theory is illuminating, because it shows that mimesis when declined as mimetic desire has the intrinsic potentiality of driving humans to aggression and violence. Mimesis, as I have been trying to show throughout this paper, is neither intrinsically good nor bad. It is a basic functional mechanism at the core of our diversified social competencies and activities. Nevertheless, mimesis has two sides. Any serious neuroscientific attempt to shed light on the truest and deepest nature of human condition cannot neglect either side. I posit that the empirical evidence here briefly summarized and future research stimulated and driven by the currently available evidence have the potentiality to shed further light on both sides of mimesis.”

Both above mentioned points can be observed in many of de Waal’s experiments and observations. The second point becomes very clear in this fairness study. Consider the following remark by de Waal:

“Note that the first piece of cucumber is perfectly fine. The first piece she eats. Then she sees the other one getting grape, and you will see what happens…”

The Gift (by Marcel Mauss)In other words, the frustration and anger for not receiving grapes is aroused by comparison with the other monkey. Potential conflict does not arise from inequality as such, but from the tendency to imitate someone else and therefore desire what he receives, desires or possesses. The monkey is perfectly willing to eat cucumber instead of the better tasting grapes as long as her neighbor is in the same position. But would you still be happy with a little Toyota if everyone else in the neighborhood is driving a big Mercedes? We have to keep up with the Joneses, don’t we? Indeed, beyond basic needs, our and the monkey’s desires are structured by imitating others and comparing ourselves to them.

Primitive societies are well aware of the potential destructive outcomes of sharing gifts. That’s why gift exchange is highly regulated in archaic contexts. Besides establishing an acceptable hierarchy (which implies differences and inequalities), the rules of gift exchange also aim to undermine feelings of frustration and envy. To keep the peace! Essai sur le don  (The Gift), the groundbreaking study by Marcel Mauss (1872-1950) [PDF], to this day is very revealing in this regard (e.g. p.11: “To refuse to give, or to fail to invite, is – like refusing to accept – the equivalent of a declaration of war; it is a refusal of friendship and intercourse.”).

The ethical question remains whether the ties and bonds between humans that arise from mimetic interplays (manifested in empathy, fear of violence, but also lust for power and prestige) are a good basis for morality. I guess, as mimetic creatures, we have no choice but to rely on imitation. But this can be tricky. It’s very common to empathize with a friend or a clique and to imitate their hostility towards an enemy. But this kind of loyalty is not necessarily just or righteous. It’s the blind loyalty of the mafia or the mob. What if your friends or your clan is wrong? The big challenge, as put forward among others by Christ, is to include the ones that are considered “enemies” as “members of the community” – as “neighbors”, fellow human beings.

Chimpanzee Politics (Frans de Waal)René Girard claims that an imitation of Christ could guide our mimetic faculties in such a way that they would enable us to “love our enemies”. This is not to be understood in a masochistic way. To protect the victim of bullies doesn’t mean that you want to get bullied yourself. To put it differently: to speak in favor of the socially deprived or “crucified” doesn’t mean that you want to get crucified yourself, although of course you always run the risk that “bullies” don’t “show mercy” but keep on “crucifying”. Nevertheless Christ “turns the other cheek”, not because he wants another blow, but because he hopes that merciful, non-vengeful conduct will eventually be imitated.

So, empathy as the basis for morality? It depends on the examples one imitates and empathizes with. Will you follow the idol of yourself – the important person you imagine yourself to be in a certain group (that structures itself partly by excluding its “enemies”)? Or will you follow the Voice of the one who questions the image of yourself that exists at the expense of excluded others – in order to find yourself in relationship to those others?

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Wie vertrouwd is met het werk van René Girard en in het Vlaamse onderwijs actief is, zal zeker opgekeken hebben van een artikel in het tijdschrift Klasse van december 2012. De titel van het artikel luidt (klik op de titel om het te lezen): Queen bee zaait terreur – Meisjesvenijn: een subtiel machtsspel.

Queen Bees and Wannabes (Rosalind Wiseman)Uit het artikel:

  • Koningin (queen bee): een populair, mooi, sociaal vaardig meisje. Graag gezien bij leraren. Zij domineert de pikorde, laat haar meelopers de vuile klusjes opknappen. Na een tijdje vindt ze het normaal dat ze altijd haar zin krijgt.
  • Meelopers (wanna-bees): een grote groep meisjes die heel graag bij de koningin willen horen. Ze kijken naar haar op, imiteren haar en doen haar vuile werk.
  • Slachtoffer (target): valt buiten de groep, staat helemaal alleen. Ze wordt vernederd, aangetrokken en afgestoten. Ze denkt dat ze niets waard is.
  • Zwijgende omstanders (torn bystanders): meisjes die zien wat er gebeurt, maar zwijgen uit angst zelf slachtoffer te worden.

Zodra je een klas vormt, bepalen de leerlingen een ‘pikorde’. Dat is een natuurlijk groepsproces. Maar als de klassfeer verziekt of er is veel stress, loeren machtsspelletjes om de hoek.

mean girlsHet is duidelijk dat het zogenaamde target als een zondebok functioneert waartegen een groep meisjes zich mimetisch verenigt (de wanna-bees imiteren de queen bee) in tijden van crisis (als de klassfeer verziekt is). De dubbelzinnige benadering van het target (zowel aangetrokken als afgestoten) doet denken aan de even dubbelzinnige benadering van de zogenaamde pharmakoi in het Oude Griekenland. Niet toevallig, natuurlijk, heeft ook Girard hierover geschreven. Pharmakoi waren gemarginaliseerde individuen die zowel negatief als positief bejegend werden – ze leken op een of andere manier vaak gevaarlijk voor de gemeenschap, maar schenen tegelijk de oplossing voor allerlei problemen. Het ritueel van de Pharmakos (φαρμακός) bestond uit het offeren of verbannen van een menselijke zondebok door priester-tovenaars. Een tovenaar werd pharmakon genoemd. Het was aan hem om een slaaf, een kreupele of een misdadiger uit te kiezen in tijden van crisis en rampspoed (bijvoorbeeld tijdens een hongersnood, een pestepidemie of een invasie). Het slachtoffer kreeg drugs (pharmakeus) toegediend van een priester-tovenaar die pharmakeia beoefende. Het Nederlandse woord farmacie is hiervan afgeleid, en verwijst nog altijd naar middelen die genezing moeten bewerkstelligen.

Meer informatie over mogelijke pesterijen van meisjeskliekjes vind je bij Rosalind Wiseman, meer bepaald in haar boek Queen Bees & Wannabes.

Een onderhoudende film over het onderwerp, die gebaseerd is op het boek van Wiseman en een en ander in een klas bespreekbaar kan maken, is Mean Girls (Mark Waters, 2004). Daarin moet een zekere Cady (gespeeld door Lindsay Lohan) de strijd aanbinden met Regina – Latijn voor ‘Koningin’ – George (gespeeld door Rachel McAdams). Als nieuwkomer valt Cady aanvankelijk in goede aarde bij The Plastics, een meisjeskliekje dat geleid wordt door Regina, tot ze verliefd wordt op het ex-vriendje van ‘the Queen’… Een interessante verwijzing naar de film in een bespreking van Nella Larsens Passing, aan de hand van het werk van René Girard en Rosalind Wiseman, lees je hier.

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Het aloude verhaal. Van individuen die elkanders pestgedrag imiteren, en die zich op die manier verenigen rond een willekeurig slachtoffer. Een slachtoffer van wie zij echter beweren dat het dat pestgedrag “zelf uitlokt”. Een slachtoffer dat, met andere woorden, ten onrechte verantwoordelijkheid wordt toegedicht voor wat het overkomt. Een zondebok dus.

We zijn er als de kippen bij om onze eigen verantwoordelijkheid in dergelijke verhalen te ontlopen. We zijn geschokt door wat Tim Ribberink is overkomen, of Amanda Todd, of Tyler Long… We zijn verontwaardigd over het gedrag van de pesters. Maar intussen blijven we blind voor ons eigen aandeel in het creëren van een maatschappelijk klimaat dat telkens weer ruimte geeft aan vernederende woorden en daden. Aan het geweld van een bepaald soort taalgebruik. Van satire, bijvoorbeeld.

HUMOR (SATIRE) DIE ZICHZELF TE ERNSTIG NEEMT?

Ja, natuurlijk kan humor “ont-wapenend” zijn. Ruimte scheppen voor wie anders is dan jezelf begint bij een gezonde dosis zelfrelativering. En geen betere manier om jezelf te relativeren dan eens met jezelf lachen in het bijzijn van anderen. Maar tegenwoordig wordt “humor” – of wat daarvoor moet doorgaan – meer en meer een wapen ter onderdrukking van anderen. Je mag blijkbaar zelf niet meer bepalen waar je gevoeligheden en grenzen liggen, je moet “tegen een stootje” kunnen, een grapje kunnen verdragen, enzovoort. Vooraleer je jezelf kan relativeren, hebben anderen jou al – vaak ongevraagd – gerelativeerd in jouw plaats. Ze hebben jouw beslissingsruimte gekoloniseerd voor je er erg in hebt. Als je je dan gekwetst zou voelen, ligt het probleem natuurlijk niet bij die anderen, maar bij jou – jij, die geen gevoel voor humor kent of jezelf te ernstig neemt… Zo is de redenering van pesters die zichzelf niet als dusdanig herkennen, en die de verantwoordelijkheid voor het feit dat iemand zich gekwetst voelt bij de gekwetste zelf leggen – onder het mom: “Onze woorden zijn humoristisch op te vatten; wij kunnen het niet helpen dat iemand ze kwetsend opvat of niet in staat is om met mogelijks kwetsende taal om te gaan…”

En ondertussen tonen we toch ons respect voor het slachtoffer van een groep vermaledijde pesters – die zogezegd enorm van ons verschillen, maar die we in andere omstandigheden eigenlijk gewoon navolgen of imiteren. Of hoe het diaboliserende “pesten van pesters” zelf ook pesten is. Wie zich wreekt op boosdoeners, imiteert hun gedrag, en zet het kwaad dat hij dacht te bestrijden eigenlijk verder.

“Wij (‘ons groepje’) zijn niet zoals zij (‘dat groepje’); ik niet zoals hij. Want wij betuigen eer aan hun slachtoffer…” De Jezusfiguur van de canonieke evangeliën ontmaskert de hypocrisie van zulke mechanismen (Mt.23,29-31): Wee u, schriftgeleerden en farizeeën, schijnheiligen; u bouwt graftekens voor de profeten en versiert de grafstenen van de rechtvaardigen, en u zegt: “Als wij geleefd hadden in de tijd van onze vaderen, zouden wij niet medeplichtig geweest zijn aan de moord op de profeten.” Zo getuigt u zelf dat u zonen bent van profetenmoordenaars.

We zien het slachtoffer van een andere groep of van een ander individu nogal gemakkelijk, maar blijven inderdaad vaak blind voor de slachtoffers die we zelf maken. Aan de oproep tot zelfonderzoek en inkeer wordt zelden beantwoord. Aan “de stad” – de samenleving – waar het goed toeven is als mens, wordt niet verder gebouwd. Of zoals die Jezusfiguur het zegt, als “de Stem van een roepende in de woestijn” (Mt.23,37-38): Jeruzalem, Jeruzalem, dat de profeten doodt en diegenen stenigt die tot haar gezonden zijn! Hoe vaak heb Ik uw kinderen niet onder mijn hoede willen nemen, zoals een kip haar kuikens bijeenbrengt onder haar vleugels. Maar u hebt het niet gewild. Kijk, uw huis blijft onbewoond achter.

Tim, ik ken je niet. Ik ben niet direct verantwoordelijk voor je dood. Maar ik ben wel, op mijn manier, mede verantwoordelijk voor een sociaal klimaat waarin pestgedrag kan floreren. Mea culpa. Ik hoop dat ik niet te trots ben om vergiffenis te vragen aan of te ontvangen van wie ik heb gekwetst. Ik hoop dat ik van mezelf geen slachtoffer maak of mezelf als “zondebok” presenteer (zogezegd “onterecht beschuldigd van medeplichtigheid”) om mijn verantwoordelijkheid te ontlopen als “medeplichtige” in een samenleving die vaak blind blijft voor haar eigen zondebokken. Ik bid dat ik meer oog krijg voor de onbedoelde kwalijke gevolgen van bepaalde van mijn woorden en handelingen. Want ik ben hardleers en koppig. Ik hoop dat ik jou tijdig in mijn leven mag herkennen en erkennen. Zodat jij en alle andere slachtoffers misschien ooit in ons midden kunnen vertoeven, en wij niet langer “daders” hoeven te zijn. In een Bijbelse woordenschat die tot mijn achtergrond behoort, die mij helpt om een en ander uit te drukken, en die ook mijn rationele vermogens aanspreekt: Als “Abel” niet langer dood is, is “Kaïn” niet langer schuldig aan moord, en dan krijgt Kaïn nogmaals een kans om de relatie met Abel nieuw leven in te blazen… In die geschonken vrijheid wil ook ik in mijn leven verantwoordelijkheid opnemen voor de “Abel” in mijn midden, wetende dat dit met vallen en opstaan gebeurt door vergeving te krijgen en te geven, maar dat daarmee dat grote “Lichaam van Liefde” verder vorm krijgt…

Jammer genoeg is het verhaal van Tim, zoals geweten is, lang geen alleenstaand geval. In mei 2011 schreef ik reeds een reflectie over pesten (Laatste Oordeel), geholpen door de mimetische theorie van René Girard. Daarin wordt met name aan het zondebokmechanisme een centrale plaats toegekend. Dit kwam toen uit de bus – het verhaal van Tyler Long vertoont pijnlijke overeenkomsten met het verhaal van Tim Ribberink, spijtig genoeg… :

OVER OORDELEN EN LAATSTE OORDELEN BIJ DE DOOD VAN EEN MOEGETERGDE JONGEN (PDF)

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A day off from school for our pupils…

And we, teachers at a Jesuit high school (Sint-Jozefscollege, Aalst, Belgium), took time off to reflect on today’s challenges in education. Not surprisingly in our case, the legacy of St. Ignatius of Loyola (1491-1556) continues to provide the guiding principles to make this reflection possible.

The core of Ignatian spirituality, as well as the source of Jesuit pedagogy, consists of the Discernment of Spirits. Sometimes we’re guided by bad motivations, which ultimately lead us towards an inability to love ourselves, others, the world and God. Good motivations, on the other hand, facilitate our ability to love. Ignatius of Loyola, founder of the Jesuit order, became a master in discerning good from bad inner movements. A good introduction to the Discernment of Spirits can be found by clicking here.

Our school tried to summarize different aspects of this Ignatian spirituality of discernment in four pillars:

1. CURA PERSONALIS

2. NON MULTA SED MULTUM

3. FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY

4. MAGIS

I made the following video clip to show a glimpse of the potentially emancipatory power of these four pillars, especially in the face of some of today’s challenges and conventional “mindframes”. It was initially meant to ignite reflection on our behavior in school, but it could inspire other contexts as well. After all, we’re all each other’s teachers, we’re all each other’s “example”…

CLICK TO WATCH:

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“I hate all this philosophical mumbo-jumbo! It just doesn’t make any sense!”

I’ve experienced reactions like these from my students quite often while trying to teach them some philosophy. They express the normal frustration people get when they just don’t seem to succeed in mastering the issues they’re facing. To be honest, I more than once imitated their feelings of despair by getting frustrated and impatient myself about their inability to understand what I was trying to say. The story of students blaming teachers for not explaining things well enough, and of teachers responding that their students just don’t try hard enough, is all too familiar. But, at the end of the day, having worked through some negative emotions, I somehow always manage to sit down at my desk and try to improve upon my part of communicating. I can only hope it stays that way.

The writings of Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas are not always easy to understand, let alone agree with. Roger Burggraeve, one of my professors at the University of Leuven, has proven to be an excellent guide to introduce me to the philosophy of Levinas (click here for an excellent summary by Burggraeve). But explanations at an academic level are not always easily transferable to a high school level. Regarding Levinas I’m faced with the challenge to explain something about his thoughts on “the Other” and “the Other’s face”. Although Levinas’ musings often appear to be highly abstract for someone who didn’t receive any proper philosophical training, his thinking springs from very “earthly”, even dark realities and experiences – especially the experience of the Holocaust. Levinas’ response to the threat of totalitarianism is actually very down to earth, but because it wants to be “fundamental”, I can imagine it indeed sometimes comes across as mumbo-jumbo to sixteen year olds.

Luckily enough for me, as a teacher, an episode of The Fresh Prince of Bel Air (season 3, episode 12 The Cold War) can help to make clear what “the encounter with the Other” could be like in a particular situation. Moreover, it also serves as a good way to connect René Girard’s mimetic theory with some of Levinas’ main insights. Here’s the story:

Will and his nephew Carlton have a crush on the same girl, Paula. Carlton had been the first to date Paula, but after introducing her to Will, she also becomes Will’s object of interest. Will imitates the desire of Carlton and, upon noticing this, Carlton in turn reinforces his desire for Paula by imitating his new rival Will. This is a prime and archetypal example of what Girard has labeled mimetic (or imitative) desire, which potentially leads to mimetic rivalry. Will and Carlton become each other’s obstacles in the pursuit of an object (in this case a person, Paula) they point to each other as desirable. They become jealous of each other and try to out compete one another. They both fear the other as a threat to their self-esteem and independency. Ironically however, as they try to differ themselves from each other by unwittingly imitating each other’s desire, they resemble each other more and more. In fact, their sense of “being” becomes truly dependent on the other they despise. They end up dueling each other in a pillow fight, trying to settle the score.

At one moment, near the end of Will and Carlton’s fight, something happens which indeed illustrates what Levinas means with “response to the Other’s face” (click here for some excerpts from Levinas’ Ethics as First Philosophy). Will pretends to be severely injured (“My eye!”), whereon Carlton totally withdraws from the fight. Carlton finds himself confronted with Will’s vulnerability, and is genuinely concerned for his nephew’s well-being. The Other he was fighting turns out to be more than his rival, more than the product of his (worst) imaginations. Indeed, before being a rival the Other “is simply there“, not reducible to any of our concerns, desires or anxieties. Carlton is not concerned for his own sake: he doesn’t seem to fear any punishment, nor does he seem to desire any reward while showing his care for Will. He abandons all actions of self-interest “in the wink of an eye”.

This is an ethical moment, as Levinas understands it. It goes beyond utilitarianism which, as it turns out, justifies itself as being “good” by arguing that self-interest (i.e. what proves useful for one’s own well-being) eventually serves the interest (well-being) of others as well. Putting forward the effect on the well-being of others as justification for utilitarianism is telling, and shows that utilitarianism in itself doesn’t seem to be “enough” as a foundation for ethics. Moreover, utilitarianism serves the interests of “the majority”, which threatens to overlook what happens to minorities “other than” that majority. Sometimes sacrificing a minority might seem “logical” from this point of view. By contrast, in what is “the ethical moment” according to Levinas, one fears being a murderer more than one’s own death. In other words, provoked by the Other’s “nakedness” and “vulnerability” (the Other’s face which lies beyond our visible descriptions and labeling of the Other), OUR FEAR OF THE OTHER IS TRANSFORMED IN FEAR FOR THE OTHER. The mimetic rivalry between Will and Carlton is thus interrupted until, of course, Will reveals he was only joking about his injury… and the pillow fight continues.

CLICK TO WATCH:

Eventually, Will and Carlton quit fighting and start confessing their wrongdoings towards one another. They no longer imitate each other’s desire to assert themselves over against one another, but they imitate each other in being vulnerable and forgiving, recognizing “each Other”. They imitate each other’s withdrawal from mimetically converging desire and rivalry. It is by becoming “Other” to one another that they paradoxically gain a new sense of “self”, as an unexpected consequence…

Enjoy that grand twist of humor in Will Smith’s unexpected philosophy class…

CLICK TO WATCH:

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The common view in Antiquity on people who fell victim to sickness, suffering and “bad fortune” was that “they had it coming” because of certain transgressions they (or their ancestors) committed against the sacred order of things. In other words, because of sin. It is clear, for instance, that Job’s friends and relatives follow this logic in the Old Testament book of Job. They keep on suggesting that Job somehow deserves the suffering he has to endure. Jesus radically challenges this way of thinking. A prime example of this can be found in John 9:1-12, the story of Jesus healing a young man who had been blind from birth. Given the common understanding of sickness in their pre-modern society, it comes as no surprise that the disciples of Jesus pose the following question:

His disciples asked him, “Rabbi, who sinned, this man or his parents, that he was born blind?” (John 9:2)

The answer of Jesus must have come as a complete and shocking surprise:

“Neither this man nor his parents sinned,” said Jesus, “but this happened so that the works of God might be displayed in him.” (John 9:3)

This story reveals some important aspects of Jesus’ understanding of God and man. Apparently, according to Jesus, God blesses those who are sick, those who suffer – in short: the victims. Not because they are victims per se, but because they are in fact fellow human beings and their suffering is regarded as unjust. This belief in a God who regards victims as human beings who suffer unjustly is exemplified by the healing activity of Jesus, which consists in opening up the possibility for these victims to become part of the (human) community again. Since Jesus reverses the idea that victims are condemned (or “chosen”) by some divine command to suffer, but insists that God actually blesses and “chooses” them as human beings, he takes away the reasons for their marginalization, or persecution and expulsion. Moreover, he takes away, at the same time, the traditional means by which communities structure themselves, and challenges them to include those they experience as a threat, a disgrace or even as an enemy.

As the story turns out, the blind man saw something that the people of his community and Jesus’ disciples remained blind to. Jesus paradoxically accomplishes that the actual sinfulness is no longer located in the blind man, but rather in what had been the (rather unwitting) complicity of the individual members of an entire community to take part in mechanisms of expulsion.

Ever since the traditions of the Gospel spread in western culture, being a victim was gradually no longer experienced as an inevitable and sacred “state of affairs”, nor as a disgrace or something to be ashamed of. Western civilizations developed a growing active and moral concern for victims in the course of their history. Sadly, however, the search for victims all too often became a perversion of Christ’s healing activity. Sometimes we use the claim of being a victim to victimize others and to perpetuate mechanisms of exclusion. Not surprisingly, René Girard and Gil Bailie have some very insightful thoughts on the matter.

René Girard in Evolution and Conversion – Dialogues on the Origins of Culture, Continuum, London, New York, 2007, p. 236:

“We have experienced various forms of totalitarianism that openly denied Christian principles. There has been the totalitarianism of the Left, which tried to outflank Christianity; and there has been totalitarianism of the Right, like Nazism, which found Christianity too soft on victims. This kind of totalitarianism is not only alive but it also has a great future. There will probably be some thinkers in the future who will reformulate this principle in a politically correct fashion, in more virulent forms, which will be more anti-Christian, albeit in an ultra-Christian caricature. When I say more Christian and more anti-Christian, I imply the figure of the Anti-Christ. The Anti-Christ is nothing but that: it is the ideology that attempts to outchristianize Christianity, that imitates Christianity in a spirit of rivalry.

[…]

You can foresee the shape of what the Anti-Christ is going to be in the future: a super-victimary machine that will keep on sacrificing in the name of the victim.”

Gil Bailie in Violence Unveiled – Humanity at the Crossroads, The Crossroad Publishing Company, New York, 1995, p. 20:

“There’s plenty of truth in the revised picture of Western history that the young are now routinely taught, the picture of the West’s swashbuckling appetite for power, wealth, and dominion. What’s to be noted is that it is we, and not our cultural adversaries, who are teaching it to them. It is we, the spiritual beneficiaries of that less than always edifying history, who automatically empathize more with our ancestors’ victims than with our ancestors themselves. If we are tempted to think that this amazing shift is the product of our own moral achievement, all we have to do is look around at how shamelessly we exploit it for a little power, wealth, and dominion of our own.

The fact is that the concern for victims has gradually become the principal gyroscope in the Western world. Even the most vicious campaigns of victimization – including, astonishingly, even Hitler’s – have found it necessary to base their assertion of moral legitimacy on the claim that their goal was the protection or vindication of victims. However savagely we behave, and however wickedly and selectively we wield this moral gavel, protecting or rescuing innocent victims has become the cultural imperative everywhere the biblical influence has been felt.”

Just a few days ago I came across an example of this dynamic, i.e. the dynamic of proclaiming oneself as a victim and of having certain rights to persecute “evil others” because of it. Extreme right wing and nationalist parties, among others, often use the tactic of presenting themselves and their followers as victims to make certain political and social claims. In Belgium and in the Netherlands this is called the “Calimero-complex”. The cartoon character Calimero is a hapless chick, fresh out of the egg, whose famous line is: “This is not  fair; they are big and I am small.” Hence the “Calimero-complex” is used to denote persons who think the world is against them, and who revel in an underdog role.

So, what happened? Well, a few days ago I visited some friends in Antwerp, one of the big cities in Belgium, in Flanders. That’s where I saw this poster of the extreme right wing and Flemish nationalist party “Vlaams Belang” (“Flemish Interest”). It portrayed a caricature of “Lamb of God”, the beautiful 15th century painting by the Van Eyck brothers (conserved at Saint Bavo Cathedral, Ghent). The lamb was depicted in a black color, instead of white, thereby reinforcing the stereotypical connotation that “blacks are bad”. The poster was accompanied with slogans to warn certain people to “stay away from our country”, namely “impostors [abusing the system to seek asylum], illegal immigrants, Islamists, criminal foreigners”. The poster suggests that the people mentioned defile our cultural identity and heritage, and that they are no innocent lambs or wrongfully accused scapegoats.

Filip Dewinter, leading figure of Vlaams Belang, claims that the posters were in no way issued by his party and is filing a complaint. According to him, the unknowns who did issue the poster are trying to blackguard his party, presenting illegal immigrants and others as people who are targeted as “black sheep” by Vlaams Belang. Filip Dewinter suggests that his party falls victim to a campaign that reverses what is actually happening. According to him, Vlaams Belang indeed has every right, even a duty, to defend the country against illegal immigrants and the like, and these people shouldn’t be depicted as “black sheep” or victims.

I guess the real victims of these quarrels stay out of sight. The ones who have to flee their home-country, who have no real options, but are labeled as “illegal immigrants” all the same. Just the beginning of this month, Parwais Sangari, a young promising Afghan and in no way a criminal, had to leave our country to return to Kabul – you know, the place where you wouldn’t send your children on a holiday these days… Twenty year old Sangari had foster parents here. Nevertheless he was sent away to walk around aimlessly, without any real home, in the Afghan capital – after four years in Belgium.

Still there’s hope. As it turns out, we’re not completely blinded by “the atmosphere of fear” we’re creating in our politics. Some people have started campaigns in favor of people like Sangari, demanding to reconsider our general asylum and migration policies.

How blinded are we? Are we capable of noticing the Victim? Can we stand the light that shines in our darkness? Can we allow ourselves to be blinded by its splendor, to see with new eyes and new hearts?

by on

Once there was this girl, having the time of her life in a happy relationship. Until her boyfriend cheated on her. After that, she couldn’t go on with him. So they broke up.

A year later, she met this other guy. Love at first sight. They started dating. A few months down the road of this new romantic affair, a little fear started creeping into her mind: “What if I’ll be cheated on, again?” The fear grew bigger, as did her desire to safeguard her relationship. So she started controlling her new boyfriend, pressing him to inform her about his whereabouts. He didn’t do anything wrong, but he nevertheless had to suffer from her anxieties. Until he couldn’t stand it any longer, and her worst fear came true: he broke up with her. Tragic. Ironic. All she had done to avoid the destruction of the relationship brought about the relationship’s downfall. For whoever wants to save his life will lose it… (Matthew 16:25a).

What happened? Well, the girl was hurt, and she had been sad and angry because of it. Instead of letting go of her sadness and frustration, she started focusing on these emotions again while being in a new relationship. And she started hurting a guy who hadn’t done anything to cause her pain, insinuating he was not trustworthy and accusing him of being a liar and a cheater. In other words, she imitated the blows inflicted on her persona by inflicting similar blows on someone else. It was her way of taking revenge. Her new boyfriend turned out to be her scapegoat: someone who had to answer for her anger, although he was innocent. There is indeed, as René Girard and so many other Christian thinkers rightly point out, a nearly inextricable connection between the mimetic principle of vengeance and the scapegoating impulse.

In order to break the vicious cycle of hurt inflicting hurt – the cycle of original sin -, Christ invites us to take part in an act of creation. This is a creatio ex nihilo (creation out of nothing), meaning that our actions are no longer defined by the lesser and greater evil we endured in the past. To return to the situation of the girl: Christ invites her to “turn the other cheek” as she begins a new relationship. To turn the other cheek indeed means that you refuse to let your relationships and yourself be defined by the hurtful mechanisms that eventually destroy relationships. Christ invites the girl to trust being vulnerable again. He invites her to keep faith over fear – for “fear leads to anger, to hate, to suffering” as some famous wise man summarized Christ’s advice…

Forgiveness is at the heart of creation, destabilizing the balance of “eye for eye, tooth for tooth” – for, as some other wise man allegedly said: “An eye for an eye leaves the whole world blind”. Coming from outside the cycle of bad deeds or “bad karma“, the grace of forgiveness opens up the possibility of a new kind of imitation or mimesis. Instead of imitating each other in trying to assert ourselves over against one another – as theologian James Alison would say –, “turning the other cheek” is an invitation to begin an imitation of recognizing and accepting each other’s vulnerability. Recognizing that “no one is without sin”, in order to end “casting the first stone”. It’s an invitation to shy away from self-assertion over against one another – which would be called a movement of kenosis (“self-emptying”) in theological terms. The imitatio Christi would thus lead to the recovery of human beings, for “being human” means “being in relationships”, and the act of grace Christ invites us to take part in is precisely aimed at restoring those relationships. Therefore: Whoever loses his life for me will find it… (Matthew 16:25b).

So Matthew 5:38-39 is not an invitation to be masochistic. It’s quite the opposite. It’s a radical refusal to surrender to the evil that we experience from time to time. It’s an invitation to obey the creative call of Love (click here to read more) – which is, paradoxically, truly liberating:

“You have heard that it was said, ‘Eye for eye, and tooth for tooth.’But I tell you, Do not resist an evil person. If someone strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also…”